Principles for priority setting in health care are typically forged by experts influenced by the normative literature on priority setting. Meanwhile, their implementation is subject to democratic deliberation, political pressures, and administrative bureaucracy. Sometimes expert proposals are democratically rejected. This points towards a problem: on the one hand, the fact that a majority shares a moral belief does not inherently validate this belief. On the other hand, when justifying a position to others, we cannot expect much success without engaging with their moral judgments. In this work we examine the possibility of including so-called popular views in a reflective equilibrium process. In reflective equilibrium processes, we are usually interested in considered judgments rather than mere intuitions. Popular views, arguably, often do not meet this standard. To mitigate this, we propose to bolster popular views by linking them with theoretical frameworks echoing similar moral perspectives. We use illness severity as a case study and show that a set of popular accounts can provide considered judgments that merit inclusion in a publicly informed reflective equilibrium process. This is plausibly a way forward in the search for priority setting principles that are both normatively sound and acceptable to the public. Our method provides a general framework for refining available data on popular views on moral questions, including when we cannot assess the consideredness of such views.

Pragmatism gained considerable attention in bioethical discussions in the early 21st century. However, some dimensions and contributions of pragmatism to bioethics remain underexplored in both research and practice. It is argued that pragmatism can make a distinctive contribution to bioethics through its concept, developed by Charles S. Peirce and John Dewey, that ethical issues can be resolved through experimental inquiry. Dewey\'s proposal that policies can be confirmed or disconfirmed through experimentation is developed by comparing it to the confirmation of scientific hypotheses, with a focus on the objection that the consequences of following a moral view or policy do not provide guidance on choosing among competing ethical perspectives. As confirmation of scientific hypotheses typically relies on evidence gathered from observation, the possibility of ethically relevant observation is then explored based on Peirce\'s views on feelings as emotional interpretants. Finally, the connection between Dewey\'s experimental ethics and democracy is outlined and compared to unfettered ethical progressivism.

Recent developments in the study of pain in animals have demonstrated the potential for pain perception in a variety of wholly aquatic species such as molluscs, crustaceans and fish. This allows us to gain insight into how the ecological pressures and differential life history of living in a watery medium can yield novel data that inform the comparative physiology and evolution of pain. Nociception is the simple detection of potentially painful stimuli usually accompanied by a reflex withdrawal response, and nociceptors have been found in aquatic invertebrates such as the sea slug Aplysia. It would seem adaptive to have a warning system that allows animals to avoid life-threatening injury, yet debate does still continue over the capacity for non-mammalian species to experience the discomfort or suffering that is a key component of pain rather than a nociceptive reflex. Contemporary studies over the last 10 years have demonstrated that bony fish possess nociceptors that are similar to those in mammals; that they demonstrate pain-related changes in physiology and behaviour that are reduced by painkillers; that they exhibit higher brain activity when painfully stimulated; and that pain is more important than showing fear or anti-predator behaviour in bony fish. The neurophysiological basis of nociception or pain in fish is demonstrably similar to that in mammals. Pain perception in invertebrates is more controversial as they lack the vertebrate brain, yet recent research evidence confirms that there are behavioural changes in response to potentially painful events. This review will assess the field of pain perception in aquatic species, focusing on fish and selected invertebrate groups to interpret how research findings can inform our understanding of the physiology and evolution of pain. Further, if we accept these animals may be capable of experiencing the negative experience of pain, then the wider implications of human use of these animals should be considered.