In her recent paper, Emanuele Mangione proposes combining maternal spindle transfer (MST) and reciprocal effortless in vitro fertilisation (ReIVF) to enable both females to have genetic and gestational ties with the same child, which can particularly benefit lesbian couples. This response rejects Mangione\'s proposal for the reason that the additional biological ties created by MST+ReIVF, compared with the reception of oocytes from partner (ROPA), are unnecessary. ROPA is currently the most effective method for redistributing biological ties within lesbian couples, allowing one member to provide the egg and the other to carry the fetus. The additional biological ties created by MST+ReIVF are quantitatively too small to significantly enhance parental bonding or couple relationships, and their potential harms to both prospective parents and children outweigh any minor benefits. Furthermore, like ROPA, MST+ReIVF fails to address deeper feminist concerns. Therefore, I propose a new idea: combining in vitro gametogenesis with ectogenesis, which can offer far more reproductive choices and greater potential to address deeper feminist concerns than MST+ReIVF.

Infertility patients and patient advocates have long argued for classifying infertility as a disease, in the hopes that this recognition would improve coverage for and access to fertility treatment. However, for many fertility patients, including older women, single women and same-sex couples, infertility does not represent a true disease state. Therefore, while calling infertility a \'disease\' may seem politically advantageous, it might actually exclude patients with \'social\' or \'relational\' infertility from treatment. What is needed is a new conceptual framing of infertility that better reflects the profound significance of being infertile for many people and the importance of addressing infertility in order to improve their lives. In this paper, we argue that the capability approach provides this moral underpinning. The capability approach is concerned with what people are able to do, and whether they are able to act in a way that is in keeping with their own values and goals. The ability to procreate and build a family is a fundamental capacity and can be a major part of self-fulfilment, regardless of sexual orientation or family arrangement. Since the capability approach asks us to conceive of equality in terms of equal capabilities, it provides a strong ethical impetus for society to help those who cannot conceive on their own to do so with assisted reproduction.

Can AI substitute a human physician\'s second opinion? Recently the Journal of Medical Ethics published two contrasting views: Kempt and Nagel advocate for using artificial intelligence (AI) for a second opinion except when its conclusions significantly diverge from the initial physician\'s while Jongsma and Sand argue for a second human opinion irrespective of AI\'s concurrence or dissent. The crux of this debate hinges on the prevalence and impact of \'false confirmation\'-a scenario where AI erroneously validates an incorrect human decision. These errors seem exceedingly difficult to detect, reminiscent of heuristics akin to confirmation bias. However, this debate has yet to engage with the emergence of explainable AI (XAI), which elaborates on why the AI tool reaches its diagnosis. To progress this debate, we outline a framework for conceptualising decision-making errors in physician-AI collaborations. We then review emerging evidence on the magnitude of false confirmation errors. Our simulations show that they are likely to be pervasive in clinical practice, decreasing diagnostic accuracy to between 5% and 30%. We conclude with a pragmatic approach to employing AI as a second opinion, emphasising the need for physicians to make clinical decisions before consulting AI; employing nudges to increase awareness of false confirmations and critically engaging with XAI explanations. This approach underscores the necessity for a cautious, evidence-based methodology when integrating AI into clinical decision-making.

The Journal of Medical Ethics previously published on the debate in the UK and the Netherlands concerning the legal age limits imposed on donor-conceived people for access to information about the identity of gamete and embryo donors. In that publication, three arguments were foregrounded against lowering these age limits as a general rule for all donor-conceived people. In this contribution, we engage with these arguments and argue why we think they are insufficient to maintain the age limits. In contrast, we argue for a more suited, contextual and relational ethical framework based on care ethics, which emphasises relational autonomy and its dynamic, contextual development. This framework, we argue, provides a comprehensive approach for the analysis we made of the question of age limits and was applied in research performed in the Netherlands, commissioned by the Dutch Minister of Health. The framework enabled us to weigh the multidisciplinary-legal, psychological, phenomenological and ethical-findings of our research.

In recent years, the principle of informed consent has come under significant pressure with the rise of biobanks and data infrastructures for medical research. Study-specific consent is unfeasible in the context of biobank and data infrastructure research; and while broad consent facilitates research, it has been criticised as being insufficient to secure a truly informed consent. Dynamic consent has been promoted as a promising alternative approach that could help patients and research participants regain control over the use of their biospecimen and health data in medical research. Critical voices have focused mainly on concerns around its implementation; but little has been said about the argument that dynamic consent is morally superior to broad consent as a way to respect people\'s individual autonomy. In this paper, we identify two versions of this argument-an information-focused version and a control-focused version-and then argue that both fail to establish the moral superiority of dynamic over broad consent. In particular, we argue that since autonomous choices are a certain species of choices, it is neither obvious that dynamic consent would meaningfully enhance people\'s autonomy, nor that it is morally justifiable to act on every kind of consent choice enabled by dynamic consent.

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We respond to David Wilkinson\'s arguments against our view of the ethicality of doctors\' strikes and our claim that the 2023-2024 UK doctors\' strikes are morally permissible and arguably supererogatory.Wilkinson proposes that in specialist outpatient settings, striking doctors should help arrange their own cover to prevent disproportionate harm to patients and to abide by the principles of non-maleficence and fiduciary duty. This hasn\'t happened during the 2023-2024 UK doctors\' strikes; therefore, in his view, these strikes are morally impermissible. We reject Wilkinson\'s proposal on the grounds that the risk of disproportionate harm is adequately mitigated by existing arrangements and his interpretations of non-maleficence and fiduciary duty are overly demanding.We agree with Wilkinson that strikes put particularly high pressure on covering doctors in chronically under resourced specialisms. But this doesn\'t justify calling off or depowering doctors\' strikes because, without effective strikes, under-resourcing is likely to continue and, ultimately, cause even more harm.Wilkinson argues that doctors cannot justifiably strike in the interests of public health because they don\'t have a broad duty to public health. We think they do have such a duty; however, we argue that doctors can justifiably strike in the interest of public health whether they have such a duty or not.Finally, we defend our claim that doctors\' strikes can be supererogatory from Wilkinson\'s objections that there may be no such thing as supererogatory action and that our view absurdly entails that strikes can be supererogatory despite placing unfair demands on others.

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