矿产资源型城市的生态转型是推进我国生态文明建设、实现经济社会可持续发展的关键。现有研究忽视了转型过程中公众参与对其他主体的影响,这对于解决MRBC生态化改造面临的困境至关重要。鉴于此,从利益相关者的角度来看,本研究构建了一个新的进化博弈模型,由政府共同参与,企业,和社会因素(SF)(包括公共、自媒体,和非政府组织)。本文讨论了主要各方的利益及其相互关系,揭示了MRBC生态转型困境的因果机制和影响因素。我们的结果表明,三方博弈主体之间策略的演变和收敛表现出很强的交互性。首先,单一的产业结构,监管效率低,生态意识薄弱大大增加了转型成本,从而加剧了MRBC转化的困境。第二,转型强度和综合收益是影响转型的重要因素,不同过渡阶段影响因素的作用强度不同,这意味着不同阶段的政策重点不同。第三,在推进企业生态化转型的过程中,政府监管和SF监管具有显著的互补效应。然而,高强度监管对SF参与意愿有显著的挤出效应。因此,政府需要平衡监管强度和SF参与意愿。与现有研究相比,本研究全面反映了我国MRBC生态化改造的复杂动态博弈过程,可为我国促进MRBC生态化改造的政策提供参考。
The ecological transformation of the mineral resource-based cities (MRBCs) is the key to promoting the construction of ecological civilization and realizing the sustainable development of the social economy and society in China. Existing research ignores the influence of public participation on other subjects in the process of transformation, which is essential to solve the dilemma faced by the ecological transformation of MRBCs. In view of this, from the perspective of stakeholders, this study constructs a new evolutionary game model, which is jointly participated in by the government, enterprises, and social factors (SF) (including public, self-media, and non-governmental organizations). This paper discusses the interests of the main parties and their inter-relationships and reveals the causal mechanism and influencing factors of the dilemma of the ecological transformation of the MRBCs. Our results demonstrate that the evolution and convergence of strategies among the tripartite game agents exhibit strong interaction. First, the single industrial structure, low regulatory efficiency, and weak ecological awareness substantially increase the cost of transformation, thus exacerbating the dilemma of MRBC transformation. Second, the transformation intensity and comprehensive income are important factors affecting the transformation, and the effect intensity of influencing factors in different transition stages is different, which implies that the focus of policies in different stages is different. Third, in the process of promoting enterprise ecological transformation, government supervision and SF supervision have significant complementary effects. However, high-intensity supervision has a significant crowding-out effect on the willingness of SF to participate. Therefore, the government needs to balance the intensity of supervision and willingness of SF to participate. Compared with the existing research, this study comprehensively reflects the complex dynamic game process of the ecological transformation of MRBCs in China and can provide a reference for the policy of promoting the ecological transformation of MRBCs in China.