Laboratory data from conflict tasks, e.g. Simon and Eriksen tasks, reveal differences in response time distributions under different experimental conditions. Only recently have evidence accumulation models successfully reproduced these results, in particular the challenging delta plots with negative slopes. They accomplish this with explicit temporal dependencies in their structure or activation functions. In this work, we introduce an alternative approach to the modeling of decision-making in conflict tasks exclusively based on inhibitory dynamics within a dual-route architecture. We consider simultaneous automatic and controlled drift diffusion processes, with the latter inhibiting the former. Our proposed Dual-Route Evidence Accumulation Model (DREAM) achieves equivalent performance to previous works in fitting experimental response time distributions despite having no time-dependent functions. The model can reproduce conditional accuracy functions and delta plots with positive and negative slopes. The implications of these results, including an interpretation of the parameters and potential links to perceptual representations, are discussed. We provide Python code to fit DREAM to experimental data.
UNASSIGNED: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11571-023-09990-8.

In the present study, we investigated the influence of performance-contingent reward prospects on task performance across three visual conflict tasks with manual responses (Experiments 1 & 2: Simon and Stroop tasks; Experiment 3: Simon and Eriksen flanker task) using block-wise (Experiment 1) and trial-wise (Experiments 2 & 3) manipulations to signal the possibility of reward. Across all experiments, task performance (in reaction time and/or error rates) generally improved in reward compared with no-reward conditions in each conflict task. However, there was, if any, little evidence that the reward manipulation modulated the size of the mean conflict effects, and there was also no evidence for conflict-specific effects of reward when controlling for time-varying fluctuations in conflict processing via distributional analyses (delta plots). Thus, the results provide no evidence for conflict-specific accounts and instead favor performance-general accounts, where reward anticipation leads to overall performance improvements without affecting conflict effects. We discuss possible implications for how proactive control might modulate the interplay between target- and distractor-processing in conflict tasks.

The present study investigated global behavioral adaptation effects to conflict arising from different distractor modalities. Three experiments were conducted using an Eriksen flanker paradigm with constant visual targets, but randomly varying auditory or visual distractors. In Experiment 1, the proportion of congruent to incongruent trials was varied for both distractor modalities, whereas in Experiments 2A and 2B, this proportion congruency (PC) manipulation was applied to trials with one distractor modality (inducer) to test potential behavioral transfer effects to trials with the other distractor modality (diagnostic). In all experiments, mean proportion congruency effects (PCEs) were present in trials with a PC manipulation, but there was no evidence of transfer to diagnostic trials in Experiments 2A and 2B. Distributional analyses (delta plots) provided further evidence for distractor modality-specific global behavioral adaptations by showing differences in the slope of delta plots with visual but not auditory distractors when increasing the ratio of congruent trials. Thus, it is suggested that distractor modalities constrain global behavioral adaptation effects due to the learning of modality-specific memory traces (e.g., distractor-target associations) and/or the modality-specific cognitive control processes (e.g., suppression of modality-specific distractor-based activation). Moreover, additional analyses revealed partial transfer of the congruency sequence effect across trials with different distractor modalities suggesting that distractor modality may differentially affect local and global behavioral adaptations.

The recently developed diffusion model for conflict tasks (DMC) Ulrich et al. (Cognitive Psychology, 78, 148-174, 2015) provides a good account of data from all standard conflict tasks (e.g., Stroop, Simon, and flanker tasks) within a common evidence accumulation framework. A central feature of DMC\'s processing dynamics is that there is an initial phase of rapid accumulation of distractor evidence that is then selectively withdrawn from the decision mechanism as processing continues. We argue that this assumption is potentially troubling because it could be viewed as implying qualitative changes in the representation of distractor information over the time course of processing. These changes suggest more than simple inhibition or suppression of distractor information, as they involve evidence produced by distractor processing \"changing sign\" over time. In this article, we (a) develop a revised DMC (RDMC) whose dynamics operate strictly within the limits of inhibition/suppression (i.e., evidence strength can change monotonically, but cannot change sign); (b) demonstrate that RDMC can predict the full range of delta plots observed in the literature (i.e., both positive-going and negative-going); and (c) show that the model provides excellent fits to Simon and flanker data used to benchmark the original DMC at both the individual and group level. Our model provides a novel account of processing differences across Simon and flanker tasks. Specifically, that they differ in how distractor information is processed on congruent trials, rather than incongruent trials: congruent trials in the Simon task show relatively slow attention shifting away from distractor information (i.e., location) while complete and rapid attention shifting occurs in the flanker task. Our new model highlights the importance of considering dynamic interactions between top-down goals and bottom-up stimulus effects in conflict processing.

In conflict tasks, such as the Simon, Eriksen flanker, or Stroop task, the congruency effect is often reduced after an incongruent compared to a congruent trial: the congruency sequence effect (CSE). It was suggested that the CSE may reflect increased processing of task-relevant information and/or suppression of task-irrelevant information after experiencing an incongruent relative to a congruent trial. In the present study, we contribute to this discussion by applying the Diffusion Model for Conflict tasks (DMC) framework in the context of CSEs to flanker and Simon tasks. We argue that DMC independently models the task-relevant and task-irrelevant information and thus is a first good candidate for disentangling their unique contributions. As a first approach, we fitted DMC conjointly or separately to previously congruent or incongruent trials, using four empirical flanker and two Simon data sets. For the flanker task, we fitted the classical DMC version. For the Simon task, we fitted a generalized DMC version which allows the task-irrelevant information to undershoot when swinging back to zero. After considering the model fits, we present a second approach, where we implemented a cognitive control mechanism to simulate the influence of increased processing of task-relevant information or increased suppression of task-irrelevant information. Both approaches demonstrate that the suppression of task-irrelevant information is essential to create the typical CSE pattern. Increased processing of task-relevant information, however, could rarely describe the CSE accurately.

Complex cognitive tasks require different stages of processing (i.e. conflict monitoring, attentional resource allocation and stimulus categorisation). Performance differences between bilinguals and monolinguals on conflict tasks can be affected by the balance of these sub-processes. The current study investigated the effect of bilingualism on these sub-processes during a conflict task with medium monitoring demand. Behavioural responses and evoked potentials from bilinguals and monolinguals were examined during a flanker task with 25% incongruent trials. Behavioural differences were analysed by means of averaged response times and exponentially modified Gaussian analyses of response time distributions. For evoked potentials, the study focussed on N2 (reflecting conflict monitoring) and P3 responses (reflecting allocation of attentional resources for cognitive control). Bilinguals had significantly longer response distribution tails compared to monolinguals. Bilinguals were shown to have a more pronounced N2 and smaller P3 compared to monolinguals, independent of condition, suggesting a different balance of sub-processes for the two groups. This suggests that bilinguals were engaged more strongly in monitoring processes, leading to the allocation of fewer attentional resources during stimulus categorisation. Additionally, the P3 amplitudes were negatively related with the length of response distribution tails for bilinguals. These results are consistent with enhanced conflict monitoring in bilinguals that led to reduced engagement of attentional resources for stimulus categorisation. This enhanced conflict monitoring could lead to occasional extremely slow responses. Thus, the bilingual experience appears to impact the balance of cognitive control processes during conflict tasks, which might only be reflected in a minority of responses.

Questions about measurement of individual differences in implicit attitudes, which have been the focus so far in this exchange, should be distinguished from more general questions about whether implicit attitudes exist and operate in our minds. Theorists frequently move too quickly from pessimistic results regarding the first set of questions to pessimistic conclusions about the second. That is, they take evidence that indirect measures such as the implicit association test (IAT) disappoint as individual difference measures and use it to (mistakenly) suggest that people do not in fact have implicit attitudes directed at stigmatized groups. In this commentary, I dissect this mistake in detail, drawing key lessons from a parallel debate that has unfolded in cognitive science about \"conflict tasks\" such as the Stroop task. I argue that the evidence overall supports a nuanced conclusion: Indirect measures such as the IAT measure individual differences in implicit attitudes poorly, but they-via distinct lines of evidence-still support the view that implicit attitudes exist. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Theory and Methods.

The cognitive processes underlying the ability of human performers to trade speed for accuracy is often conceptualized within evidence accumulation models, but it is not yet clear whether and how these models can account for decision-making in the presence of various sources of conflicting information. In the present study, we provide evidence that speed-accuracy tradeoffs (SATs) can have opposing effects on performance across two different conflict tasks. Specifically, in a single preregistered experiment, the mean reaction time (RT) congruency effect in the Simon task increased, whereas the mean RT congruency effect in the Eriksen task decreased, when the focus was put on response speed versus accuracy. Critically, distributional RT analyses revealed distinct delta plot patterns across tasks, thus indicating that the unfolding of distractor-based response activation in time is sufficient to explain the opposing pattern of congruency effects. In addition, a recent evidence accumulation model with the notion of time-varying conflicting information was successfully fitted to the experimental data. These fits revealed task-specific time-courses of distractor-based activation and suggested that time pressure substantially decreases decision boundaries in addition to reducing the duration of non-decision processes and the rate of evidence accumulation. Overall, the present results suggest that time pressure can have multiple effects in decision-making under conflict, but that strategic adjustments of decision boundaries in conjunction with different time-courses of distractor-based activation can produce counteracting effects on task performance with different types of distracting sources of information.

This article reviews the historical usage of the concept of \'conflict\' in psychology and delineates the design and development of three basic conflict tasks (Stroop, Flanker, Stop Signal). Afterwards, important theoretical concepts to account for conflict processing are introduced. In the second part, the usage of these tasks in clinical psychology is considered. The article closes with some reflections regarding factors that may have been hitherto largely neglected in this respect.

Two experiments examined global and local behavioral adaptation effects within and across the Eriksen task, where conflict is based on stimulus letter identities, and the Simon task, where conflict is based on stimulus and response locations. Trials of the two tasks were randomly intermixed, and the list-wide proportion of congruent trials was varied in both tasks (Experiment 1) or in just one task (Experiment 2). The global adaptation effect of list-wide congruency proportion (LWPC effect) was at least as large in the Simon task as in the Eriksen task. Likewise, the local adaptation effect of previous-trial congruency (Gratton effect) was at least as large in the Simon task as in the Eriksen task. In contrast to prior studies investigating transfer across Stroop and Simon tasks, there was no dissociation between global and local adaptation effects regarding their transfer across the different conflict tasks. In fact, both local and global adaptation effects appeared largely task-specific, because there was no or only little transfer of either Gratton effects or LWPC effects from the Eriksen to the Simon task or vice versa. On the whole, the results suggest that behavioral adaptation observed in the present design does not carry over from one of these tasks to the other, suggesting no involvement of a higher-order, task-general mechanism of cognitive control.