The Dobbs decision of the United States Supreme Court and the actions of several state legislatures have made it risky, if not outright dangerous, to teach factual material concerning human embryology. At some state universities, for instance, if a professor\'s lecture is felt to teach or discuss abortion (as it might when teaching about tubal pregnancies, hydatidiform moles, or eneuploidy), that instructor risks imprisonment for up to 14 years (Gyori, 2023). Some states\' new censorship rules have thus caused professors to drop modules on abortion from numerous science and humanities courses. In most states, instructors can still teach about human embryonic development and not risk putting their careers or livelihoods in jeopardy. However, even in many of these institutions, students can bring a professor to a disciplinary hearing by claiming that the instructor failed to provide ample trigger warnings on such issues. This essay attempts to provide some strategies wherein human embryology and the ethical issues surrounding it might be taught and students may be given resources to counter unscientific falsehoods about fertilization and human development. This essay provides evidence for teaching the following propositions. Mis-information about human biology and medicine is rampant on the internet, and there are skills that can be taught to students that will help them determine which sites should trusted. This is a skill that needs to be taught as part of science courses.

OBJECTIVE: This review outlines novel, emerging legal risks for in-vitro fertilization (IVF) providers and patients.
RESULTS: This article reviews recent antiabortion legal developments that create novel legal risks to IVF. This article examines new potential liability for the handling or managing of embryos, and threats to safe, efficient, standard-of-care practice of IVF. It reviews established US and international judicial and regulatory frameworks based on scientifically grounded recognition of IVF embryos as deserving of \'special respect\', and finds this approach to be an alternative for law and policy makers.
CONCLUSIONS: Defining life as \'beginning at fertilization\' (or \'conception\') or otherwise embracing \'embryonic personhood\' creates emerging legal vulnerabilities and concerns for IVF patients and professionals who handle embryos and threatens standard-of-care IVF. Internationally and domestically established, scientifically grounded understandings of IVF embryos, rather than religious beliefs, should be the basis for legal frameworks that accord appropriate - but not unlimited - protections to IVF embryos. This article presents this framework as an alternative to the current path being embraced by some US policymakers and courts, as a means of protecting the rights of patients, providers and the families they create.

According to birth certificates, the life of a child begins once their body comes out of the mother\'s womb. But when does their organismal life begin? Science holds a palette of answers-depending on how one defines a human life. In 1984, a commission on the regulatory framework for human embryo experimentation opted not to answer this question, instead setting a boundary, 14 days post-fertilization, beyond which any experiments were forbidden. Recently, as the reproductive technologies developed and the demand for experimentation grew stronger, this boundary may be set aside leaving the ultimate decision to local oversight committees. While science has not come closer to setting a zero point for human life, there has been significant progress in our understanding of early mammalian embryogenesis. It has become clear that the 14-day stage does in fact possess features, which make it a foundational time point for a developing human. Importantly, this stage defines the separation of soma from the germline and marks the boundary between rejuvenation and aging. We explore how different levels of life organization emerge during human development and suggest a new meaning for the 14-day stage in organismal life that is grounded in recent mechanistic advances and insights from aging studies.

This paper critically engages with how life not worth living (LNWL) and cognate concepts are used in the field of beginning-of-life bioethics as the basis of arguments for morally requiring the application of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and/or germline genome editing (GGE). It is argued that an objective conceptualization of LNWL is largely too unreliable in beginning-of-life cases for deriving decisive normative reasons that would constitute a moral duty on the part of intending parents. Subjective frameworks are found to be more suitable to determine LNWL, but they are not accessible in beginning-of-life cases because there is no subject yet. Conceptual and sociopolitical problems are additionally pointed out regarding the common usage of clear case exemplars. The paper concludes that a moral requirement for the usage of PGD and GGE cannot be derived from the conceptual base of LNWL, as strong reasons that can be reliably determined are required to limit reproductive freedom on moral grounds. Educated predictions on prospective well-being might still be useful regarding the determination of moral permissibility of PGD and/or GGE. It is suggested that due to the high significance of subjective experience in the normativity of beginning-of-life bioethics, the discipline is called to more actively realize the inclusion of people with disabilities. This regards for instance research design, citation practices, and language choices to increase the accessibility of societal debates on the reproductive ethics of genetic technologies.

Recent advancements in developmental biology enable the creation of embryo-like structures from human stem cells, which we refer to as human embryo-like structures (hELS). These structures provide promising tools to complement-and perhaps ultimately replace-the use of human embryos in clinical and fundamental research. But what if these hELS-when further improved-also have a claim to moral status? What would that imply for their research use? In this paper, we explore these questions in relation to the traditional answer as to why human embryos should be given greater protection than other (non-)human cells: the so-called Argument from Potential (AfP). According to the AfP, human embryos deserve special moral status because they have the unique potential to develop into persons. While some take the development of hELS to challenge the very foundations of the AfP, the ongoing debate suggests that its dismissal would be premature. Since the AfP is a spectrum of views with different moral implications, it does not need to imply that research with human embryos or hELS that (may) have \'active\' potential should be completely off-limits. However, the problem with determining active potential in hELS is that this depends on development passing through \'potentiality switches\' about the precise coordinates of which we are still in the dark. As long as this epistemic uncertainty persists, extending embryo research regulations to research with specific types of hELS would amount to a form of regulative precaution that as such would require further justification.

暂无摘要。

暂无摘要。

暂无摘要。

I argue against responsibility arguments that offer a defence of abortion even on the assumption that the fetus is a person. I focus on argumentation originally offered by Judith Jarvis Thomson and then later defended by David Boonin. I offer thought experiments meant to show that, under certain conditions, one bears moral responsibility for creating a fetus. I then offer a positive argument for when one is morally responsible for the creation of a fetus. This argument relies on the presence of other forms of sex that reasonably approximate the goods of penile-vaginal intercourse. Given the presence of these options, sexual partners who engage in penile-vaginal intercourse bear moral responsibility for the creation of the fetus. While I do not think this argument settles the abortion debate - there still may be other ways to successfully defend abortion - it does explain why responsibility arguments like those offered by Thomson fail.

In this paper, I suggest that, if we are committed to accepting a threshold approach to personhood, according to which all beings above the threshold are persons with equal moral status, there are strong reasons to also recognise a second threshold that would be reached through human pregnancy, and that would confer on pregnant women a temporary superior moral status. This proposal is not based on the moral status of the fetus, but on the moral status of the pregnant woman. It is not only the fetus which is an organism sui generis: the pregnant woman, also, is a unique being. Following almost any view on the moral status of the fetus, the pregnant woman should be regarded, herself, as more than a singular individual. She is, herself, \'more than one\'. Pregnant women are also necessary for the continued survival of the human species, and there are important justice-based reasons to recognise the higher status. Furthermore, the recognition of a superior moral status for pregnant women does not imply that pregnancy should always be viewed as desirable, or imply any position on the permissibility of abortion. My proposal is not as radical as it might seem, as it does not require that pregnant women should always receive superior treatment, but only that they should to some extent. It could have a range of potential positive practical consequences. Finally, my approach does not threaten, but rather promotes, human equality.