This study examines the UK\'s May 2023 judgment in an international organ trafficking and organ tourism case. Human trafficking for organ removal is one of the least understood but growing forms of trafficking worldwide. Countries in the Middle East, Asia, and the Americas are often widely criticized by the international transplant community as sites for organ trafficking. However, we believe that when discussing this issue, it is not just these areas that need to be addressed. What is particularly special is that this case not only involves transnational human trafficking, organ trafficking, and illegal organ transplantation interest chains but also involves the participation of national political officials and complex social and humanistic factors. This article focuses on the current ethical and policy issues involved in organ transplant tourism and organ trafficking and analyzes the implications of this case for our country\'s donation and transplantation work.

OBJECTIVE: Ongoing quality improvement (QI) processes in the authors\' department include the insertion of a Kellgren-Lawrence (KL) osteoarthritis grading template in knee radiography reports to decrease unnecessary MRI. However, uniform adoption of this grading system is lacking. Department-wide financial incentives were instituted to improve compliance with QI metrics. The purpose of this study was to evaluate the effect of a financial incentive on KL grading system use and to compare compliance rates of musculoskeletal (MSK) radiologists with those of general radiologists who were not financially incentivized to use KL grading.
METHODS: Percentages of all knee radiography reports containing KL grading with standardized follow-up recommendations were determined by querying the departmental radiology database before and after the introduction of the new quality-based financial incentive. Preincentive compliance rates for MSK and general radiologists were compared with an adoption period and two separate 6-month postincentive periods.
RESULTS: In total, 52,673 reports were retrospectively analyzed for KL grading use (41,670 reports interpreted by MSK radiologists and 11,003 interpreted by general radiologists). Increase in compliance was greatest among MSK radiologists\' reports during the incentivized adoption period (from 36.1% to 53.2%). This improvement was sustained among MSK radiologists and averaged 62.7% during the most recently studied postimplementation period. A lesser degree of improvement in compliance was observed in nonincentivized general radiologists\' reports (from 19.3% to 27.5%); during the postimplementation follow-up period, their compliance decreased to 26.5%.
CONCLUSIONS: The introduction of a financial incentive resulted in significantly increased adoption of QI practices with sustained improvement among incentivized MSK radiologists compared with nonincentivized general radiologists.

We examine provider responses to the expansion of public subsidies in 2015 for innovative oral chemotherapy treatment, in a health system where providers were free to determine their own prices. The new treatment was known to have similar efficacy to its traditional intravenous alternative and was preferred by patients for its at-home administration. However, from a policymaker\'s perspective, the potential for misalignment between patient and provider preferences was significant given the shift to full reimbursement for the oral chemotherapy medication but no change in fee-for-service payments for associated chemotherapy services. Under this scenario, a shift away from traditional intravenous chemotherapy may entail reduced activity and revenues associated with infusions for providers, and we hypothesise that it may result in unintended policy consequences such as reduced take-up of the new therapy or higher prices. We implement a difference-in-difference model using national administrative data on services provided, and chemotherapy medications prescribed, by providers to 1850 patients in New South Wales, Australia. Our estimates indicate that the subsidies expanded access to oral chemotherapy for newly eligible patients by 15 percentage points. However, prices charged by providers for an episode of care rose by 23 percent, driven mostly by increases in service volumes. The results illustrate the importance of understanding differential provider responses to policy changes in financial incentives.

Participation in phase 2 cardiac rehabilitation (CR) is associated with significant decreases in morbidity and mortality. Unfortunately, attendance at CR is not optimal and certain populations, such as those with lower-socioeconomic status (SES), are less likely to participate. In order to remedy this disparity we have designed a trial to examine the efficacy of early case management and/or financial incentives for increasing CR participation among lower-SES patients.
We will employ a randomized controlled trial with a sample goal of 209 patients who will be randomized 2:3:3:3 to either a usual care control, to receive a case manager starting in-hospital, to receive financial incentives for completing CR sessions, or to receive both interventions.
Treatment conditions will be compared on attendance at CR and end-of-intervention (four months) improvements in cardiorespiratory fitness, executive function, and health-related quality of life. The primary outcome measures for this project will be number of CR sessions completed and the percentage who complete ≥30 sessions. Secondary outcomes will include improvements in health outcomes by condition, as well as the cost-effectiveness of the intervention with a focus on potential reductions in emergency department visits and hospitalizations. We hypothesize that either intervention will perform better than the control and that the combination of interventions will perform better than either alone.
This systematic examination of interventions will allow us to test the efficacy and cost-effectiveness of approaches that have the potential to increase CR participation substantially and significantly improve health outcomes among patients with lower-SES.

Private doctors and hospitals face incentives to intervene in the process of childbirth because they are employed and paid differently from their public counterparts. While private obstetric care has been associated with higher rates of caesarean birth, it is unclear to what extent this is attributable to unobserved selection effects related to clinical need or patient preferences. Using administrative birth data on over 280,000 births in Australia between 2007 and 2012, we implement an instrumental variables framework to account for the endogeneity of choice of care. We also exploit Australia\'s institutional framework to examine the differences in doctor-level and hospital-level incentives. We find that giving birth in a private hospital leads to a 4 percentage point increase in the probability of having an unplanned caesarean birth. Over our study period, this equates to an additional 3241 caesarean births.

Food insecurity, or lack of consistent access to enough food, is associated with low intakes of fruits and vegetables (FVs) and higher risk of chronic diseases and disproportionately affects populations with low income. Financial incentives for FVs are supported by the 2018 Farm Bill and United States (U.S.) Department of Agriculture\'s Gus Schumacher Nutrition Incentive Program (GusNIP) and aim to increase dietary quality and food security among households participating in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and with low income. Currently, there is no shared evaluation model for the hundreds of financial incentive projects across the U.S. Despite the fact that a majority of these projects are federally funded and united as a cohort of grantees through GusNIP, it is unclear which models and attributes have the greatest public health impact. We explore the evaluation of financial incentives in the U.S. to demonstrate the need for shared measurement in the future. We describe the process of the GusNIP NTAE, a federally supported initiative, to identify and develop shared measurement to be able to determine the potential impact of financial incentives in the U.S. This commentary discusses the rationale, considerations, and next steps for establishing shared evaluation measures for financial incentives for FVs, to accelerate our understanding of impact, and support evidence-based policymaking.

In October 2015, the Guangdong government of China enacted a so-called unified medical insurance payment for patients residing in Guangdong province, which fundamentally simplifies reimbursement procedures of medical insurance for the involved cross-city in-patients. Using a unique confidential dataset from 2013 to 2018 on hemorrhoid treatments at a renowned hospital in Guangzhou, the provincial capital of Guangdong, and exploiting difference-in-differences estimations based on the abovementioned policy, we document that the physicians\' incentives are a negative externality of the full medical insurance policy for cross-city in-patients and account for a 49% probability increase in improper treatments; and neither increasing the communication between physicians and patients nor enhancing the education level of patients reduces the physician-induced demand for improper treatments. A series of robustness tests indicate our findings are solid. In summary, we highlight the substantial roles of medical insurance as a driver of physician-induced demand in an emerging economy such as China.

OBJECTIVE: Financial incentives are often applied to motivate desirable performance across organisations in healthcare systems. In the 2016/2017 financial year, the National Health Service (NHS) in England set a national performance-based incentive to increase uptake of the influenza vaccination among frontline staff. Since then, the threshold levels needed for hospital trusts to achieve the incentive (ie, the targets) have ranged from 70% to 80%. The present study examines the impact of this financial incentive across eight vaccination seasons.
METHODS: A retrospective observational study examining routinely recorded rates of influenza vaccination among staff in all acute NHS hospital trusts across eight vaccination seasons (2012/2013-2019/2020). The number of trusts included varied per year, from 127 to 137, due to organisational changes. McCrary\'s density test is conducted to determine if the number of hospital trusts narrowly achieving the target by the end of each season is higher than would be expected in the absence of any responsiveness to the target. We refer to this bunching above the target threshold as a \'threshold effect\'.
RESULTS: In the years before a national incentive was set, 9%-31% of NHS Trusts reported achieving the target, compared with 43%-74% in the 4 years after. Threshold effects did not emerge before the national incentive for payment was set; however, since then, threshold effects have appeared every year. Some trusts report narrowly achieving the target each year, both as the target rises and falls. Threshold effects were not apparent at targets for partial payments.
CONCLUSIONS: We provide compelling evidence that performance-based financial incentives produced threshold effects. Policymakers who set such incentives are encouraged to track threshold effects since they contain information on how organisations are responding to an incentive, what enquiries they may wish to make, how the incentive may be improved and what unintended effects it may be having.

Antibiotic resistance is an urgent public health threat that has received substantial attention from the world\'s leading health agencies and national governmental bodies alike. However, despite increasing rates of antibiotic resistance, pharmaceutical companies are reluctant to develop new antibiotics due to scientific, regulatory, and financial barriers. Nonetheless, only a handful of countries have addressed this by implementing or proposing financial incentive models to promote antibiotic innovation. This study is comprised of a systematic review that aimed to understand which antibiotic incentive strategies are most recommended within the literature and subsequently analyzed these incentives to determine which are most likely to sustainably revitalize the antibiotic pipeline. Through a case study of Canada, we apply our incentive analysis to the Canadian landscape to provide decision-makers with a possible path forward. Based on our findings, we propose that Canada support the ongoing efforts of other countries by implementing a fully delinked subscription-based market entry reward. This paper seeks to spark action in Canada by shifting the national paradigm to one where antibiotic research and development is prioritized as a key element to addressing antibiotic resistance.

In 2011, Fairview Health Services began replacing their fee-for-service compensation model for primary care providers (PCPs), which included an annual pay-for-performance bonus, with a team-based model designed to improve quality of care, patient experience, and (eventually) cost containment. In-depth interviews and an online survey of PCPs early after implementation of the new model suggest that it quickly changed the way many PCPs practiced. Most PCPs reported a shift in orientation toward quality of care, working more collaboratively with their colleagues and focusing on their full panel of patients. The majority reported that their quality of care had improved because of the model and that their colleagues\' quality had to. The comprehensive change did, however, result in lower fee-for-service billing and reductions in PCP satisfaction. While Fairview\'s compensation model is still a work in progress, their early experiences can provide lessons for other delivery systems seeking to reform PCP compensation.