Monkeypox has been endemic in Congo and Nigeria for at least five decades. Since early May 2022, there have been numerous unprecedented outbreaks throughout the world in places without any previously reported cases. While a majority of the diagnosed cases have been within Europe and the Americas, several cases have occurred in non-endemic African countries. As of December 2022, 82,999 cases had been reported globally, prompting concern among the World Health Organization (WHO) members. While the WHO has not labeled this epidemic a Global Health Emergency, member states have begun to put forward plans to consolidate their emergency vaccine stockpiles and share the limited number of vaccines made by the single FDA-approved manufacturer, Bavarian Nordic. Many countries are concerned about how vaccines will be shared. Some of the larger donor States are positioned to be the biggest beneficiaries of vaccine sharing, while States from areas that have been suffering from the virus since the 1970s have not been allocated any. This pattern of vaccine distribution echoes that seen during the early part of the COVID-19 pandemic. Due to the similarities between Monkeypox and Smallpox, contact precautions and vaccination seem to be effective strategies to combat its rapid spread. We aim to evaluate how an eradication program model similar to that used for Smallpox can be applied to Monkeypox, and whether it can address vaccine inequity. To do this, we use a multi-pronged approach targeting disease surveillance, vaccine awareness, manufacturing, cost, and distribution strategies.

In August 2022, in response to a global mpox outbreak, the World Health Organization recommended the Vaccinia vaccination for at-risk people.
Case study.
We describe a case of a HIV-negative bisexual man who developed a symptomatic mpox infection 13weeks after completing a two-dose course of subcutaneous third-generation modified vaccinia Ankara vaccines. The case likely acquired his mpox infection in the USA; was diagnosed in Aotearoa, New Zealand; and was followed-up in Australia, as he was actively travelling during his infection.
This case highlights the importance of maintaining clinical suspicion for mpox in people who present with consistent symptoms, even if they are fully vaccinated. Also, as he travelled around Aotearoa, New Zealand, and Australia during his infection, this case highlights how public health authorities and clinicians can cooperate across jurisdictional boundaries to support cases and minimise the risk of onward transmission.

As of March 31, 2023, more than 30,000 monkeypox (mpox) cases had been reported in the United States in an outbreak that has disproportionately affected gay, bisexual, and other men who have sex with men (MSM) and transgender persons (1). JYNNEOS vaccine (Modified Vaccinia Ankara vaccine, Bavarian Nordic) was approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 2019 for the prevention of smallpox and mpox via subcutaneous injection as a 2-dose series (0.5 mL per dose, administered 4 weeks apart) (2). To expand vaccine access, an Emergency Use Authorization was issued by FDA on August 9, 2022, for dose-sparing intradermal injection of JYNNEOS as a 2-dose series (0.1 mL per dose, administered 4 weeks apart) (3). Vaccination was available to persons with known or presumed exposure to a person with mpox (postexposure prophylaxis [PEP]), as well as persons at increased risk for mpox or who might benefit from vaccination (preexposure mpox prophylaxis [PrEP]) (4). Because information on JYNNEOS vaccine effectiveness (VE) is limited, a matched case-control study was conducted in 12 U.S. jurisdictions,† including nine Emerging Infections Program sites and three Epidemiology and Laboratory Capacity sites,§ to evaluate VE against mpox among MSM and transgender adults aged 18-49 years. During August 19, 2022-March 31, 2023, a total of 309 case-patients were matched to 608 control patients. Adjusted VE was 75.2% (95% CI = 61.2% to 84.2%) for partial vaccination (1 dose) and 85.9% (95% CI = 73.8% to 92.4%) for full vaccination (2 doses). Adjusted VE for full vaccination by subcutaneous, intradermal, and heterologous routes of administration was 88.9% (95% CI = 56.0% to 97.2%), 80.3% (95% CI = 22.9% to 95.0%), and 86.9% (95% CI = 69.1% to 94.5%), respectively. Adjusted VE for full vaccination among immunocompromised participants was 70.2% (95% CI = -37.9% to 93.6%) and among immunocompetent participants was 87.8% (95% CI = 57.5% to 96.5%). JYNNEOS is effective at reducing the risk for mpox. Because duration of protection of 1 versus 2 doses remains unknown, persons at increased risk for mpox exposure should receive the 2-dose series as recommended by the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP),¶ regardless of administration route or immunocompromise status.

Mpox is a new public health outbreak that particularly threatens the homeless population. Street Medicine Phoenix (SMP) is a student-led interprofessional volunteer organization that provides medical care and other essential services to individuals experiencing homelessness in Phoenix, Arizona. In addition to core services such as wound care; health screenings (blood pressure and blood glucose.); vision screenings; HIV testing; naloxone education and distribution; flu, COVID-19, and Hepatitis A vaccinations; and community resource referrals, SMP began offering mpox education and vaccination at outreach events. During an outreach event shortly after the onset of the mpox outbreak, SMP identified 2 suspected mpox cases. Accordingly, SMP has partnered with the Maricopa County Public Health Department to set up mobile mpox vaccination clinics on the streets outside of Phoenix Arizona\'s largest homeless shelter. We share the details of these 2 cases along with our early efforts vaccinating individuals experiencing homelessness for mpox via our mobile vaccination clinic. Our experiences demonstrate the importance of community agencies providing direct outreach to underserved populations where they are at, particularly the homeless population, to address public health concerns such as emerging disease outbreaks like mpox. In addition, these cases highlight the potential significant impact that street medicine programs can have on their respective homeless communities in the context of infectious disease mitigation and emphasize the importance of partnerships with local health departments.

Vaccines against smallpox are known to have cross-protective activity against monkeypox, and smallpox and monkeypox infections are believed to generate permanent immunity. Nevertheless, there are scarce data about the possibility of reinfection or reactivation. Recently, a case of apparent monkeypox reinfection has been reported. We present a suspected case of second episode of monkeypox in a healthy and previously vaccinated man, with a confirmed primary monkeypox infection occurring three months before the second confirmed presentation.

The UK experienced a national outbreak of mpox (formerly known as monkeypox) disease that started in May, 2022, as did many other countries worldwide, with case numbers rising rapidly, mainly among gay, bisexual, and other men who have sex with men (GBMSM). To control the outbreak, Modified Vaccinia Ankara-Bavaria Nordic (MVA-BN), an attenuated smallpox vaccine, was offered to at-risk GBMSM. We aimed to assess the effectiveness of a single MVA-BN dose against symptomatic mpox disease in at-risk GBMSM.
In this case-coverage study, mpox cases in England were sent questionnaires collecting information on demographics, vaccination history, symptoms, and sexual orientation. Returned questionnaires were linked to laboratory data and a public health case management system (HP Zone) to obtain additional information on symptom onset and specimen date. Cases with a rash onset date (or alternative proxy) between July 4 and Oct 9, 2022, were included. Females, heterosexual men, and those with missing vaccination information were excluded. Vaccine effectiveness was calculated using the case-coverage method in which vaccine coverage among cases is compared with coverage in the eligible population, estimated from doses given to GBMSM and the estimated size of at-risk GBMSM. Sensitivity analyses included an increase and decrease of 20% differences in the estimated high-risk GBMSM population size.
By Nov 3, 2022, 1102 people had responded to questionnaires, of which 739 were excluded (52 females or self-declared male heterosexuals, 590 with an index date outside of the study period, and 97 missing a vaccination date). 363 cases were included in the analyses. Vaccine uptake among eligible GBMSM increased steadily from July, 2022, reaching 47% by Oct 9, 2022. Of the 363 confirmed cases, eight cases either did occur or were likely to have occurred at least 14 days after vaccination, 32 within 0-13 days after vaccination, and the rest were unvaccinated. The estimated vaccine effectiveness against symptomatic mpox at least 14 days after a single dose was 78% (95% CI 54 to 89) ranging from 71 to 85 in sensitivity analyses. Vaccine effectiveness within 0-13 days after vaccination was -4% (95% CI -50 to 29).
A single MVA-BN dose was highly protective against symptomatic mpox disease among at-risk GBMSM, making it a useful tool for mpox outbreak control when rapid protection is needed. For cases in which numbers at highest risk of infection exceed vaccine supply, there might be benefit in prioritising delivery of first doses.
UK Health Security Agency.

We report a case of occupational monkeypox virus infection from a needlestick injury in a healthcare worker in South Korea and review similar reports in the literature during 2022. Postexposure prophylactic treatment with a third-generation smallpox vaccine and antiviral agent tecovirimat inhibited local virus spread and alleviated lesion pain.

暂无摘要。

OBJECTIVE: Human monkeypox (MPX) cases are escalating worldwide. Smallpox vaccination, which was compulsory in Austria until 1981, was reported to confer 85% cross-protection against MPX.
METHODS: To assess the impact of smallpox vaccine-induced protection, the age-dependent vaccine-induced immunity against human MPX and the probability of infection according to age in the general population of Vienna, Austria, were determined using a modified susceptible-infected-removed model.
RESULTS: Within the population born before 1981, the average vaccine-induced protective effect was calculated at 50.4%, whereas in the population born thereafter, protection was lacking. The overall probability of infection after exposure to an infected patient was calculated at 73.8%, which exceeds the threshold value of 46.9% for an index patient to infect at least one other person (R ≥1.0).
CONCLUSIONS: Our model shows that if no additional interventions are taken, the collective immunization status of the population alone will not suffice to contain human MPX. Although the majority of cases have occurred in a subpopulation, given the steadily increasing incidence, dissemination into the general population remains possible, as observed before with HIV. Our model emphasizes the need for adequate containment measures and may aid in specific risk assessment because it can easily be adapted to other populations and cohorts worldwide.

The study presents an anti-vaccination action in the 19th century involving both scientific and political motivation. The research is based on an unpublished archive, namely the registries of the British Executive Police during the massive vaccination campaign in Corfu, the capital of the British possession in the Ionian Islands-Greece (1815-1864), after the smallpox outbreak of 1852. The archival material provides information about the number of vaccinated people, namely their sex, age, nationality, the year of the previous vaccination, along with the last year when a citizen \"had smallpox\". The records indicated 40,858 citizens and of these, a total 21,845 (53.46%) were vaccinated. Despite the impressive organization, the vaccination project caused a great controversy at both the scientific and political level between the British authorities and the Greek Ionian Assembly. The archival material gives a diachronic message in the fields of public health, infectious disease control, and health crisis management. The lack of control by a State or local authority, combined with political instability and the public\'s ignorance or distrust of scientific matters, are the main factors behind the failure to prevent, restrict or eradicate infectious diseases even nowadays.