暂无摘要。

It is commonplace that care should be patient-centered. Nevertheless, no universally agreed-upon definition of patient-centered care exists. By consequence, the relation between patient-centered care as such and ethical principles cannot be investigated. However, some research has been performed on the relation between specific models of patient-centered care and ethical principles such as respect for autonomy and beneficence. In this article, I offer a detailed case study on the relationship between specific measures of patient-centered care and the ethical principle of respect for autonomy. Decision Quality Instruments (DQIs) are patient-centered care measures that were developed by Karen Sepucha and colleagues. The model of patient-centered care that guided the development of these DQIs pays special attention to the ethical principle of respect for autonomy. Using Jonathan Pugh\'s theory of rational autonomy, I will investigate how the DQIs relate to patient autonomy. After outlining Pugh\'s theory of rational autonomy and framing the DQIs accordingly (Part I), I will investigate whether the methodological choices made while developing these DQIs align with respect for autonomy (Part II). My analysis will indicate several tensions between DQIs and patient autonomy that could result in what I call \"structural paternalism.\" These tensions offer us sufficient reasons, especially given the importance of the ethical principle of respect for autonomy, to initiate a more encompassing debate on the normative validity of Decision Quality Instruments. The aim of the present paper is to highlight the need for, and to offer a roadmap to, this debate.

The centrality of trust in traditional doctor-patient relationships has been criticized as inordinately paternalistic, yet in today\'s discussions about medical ethics-mostly in response to disruptive innovation in healthcare-trust reappears as an asset to enable empowerment. To turn away from paternalistic trust-based doctor-patient relationships and to arrive at an empowerment-based medical model, increasing reference is made to the importance of nurturing trust in technologies that are supposed to bring that empowerment. In this article we stimulate discussion about why the move towards patient empowerment may not be able to keep clear of the criticism of trust in traditional patient-doctor relationships. First, we explore how such a shift in trust dynamics might corrode patient empowerment in the name of patient empowerment. Second, we examine how a translocation of trust may at best push the \"trust issue\" elsewhere and at worst make it harder to evaluate trustworthiness.

After the recent approval of a new drug for the treatment of Alzheimer\'s disease, the first in almost twenty years, it is useful to consider what are the real possibilities to make a preclinical diagnosis of dementia and to treat its symptoms. The scientific community widely agrees that the drugs available today can only slow down the progression of the disease; it, therefore, seems helpful to warn against encouraging the spread of preventive testing. In fact, faced with the prospect of drugs that promise to act in the first stage of Alzheimer\'s, there might be an incentive to invest in the research on biomarkers and even healthy adults could be encouraged to increasingly resort to such prediction tests. Our claim, however, is that such massive use of biomarkers would eventually make things worse for many individuals and for society as well. A few examples are given to illustrate this risk. Therefore, our proposal is to limit access to prediction testing until truly effective treatments for Alzheimer\'s are available.

Advance directives are intended to extend patient autonomy by enabling patients to prospectively direct the care of their future incapacitated selves. There has been much discussion about issues such as whether the future incompetent self is identical to the agent who issues the advance directive or whether advance directives can legitimately secure patient autonomy. However, there is another important question to ask: to what extent and in what conditions is it ethically appropriate for one to limit the liberty or agency of one\'s future incompetent self by issuing an advance directive? In this paper, I use a virtue-ethical approach to explore this question, focusing on the case of an advance directive for the future self with moderate dementia. First, I examine virtuous attitudes with regard to autonomy and argue that one can manifest vices or ethically undesirable character traits in trying to intervene in the future self\'s life. In particular, I argue that this case can manifest vices such as disdainfulness, intellectual arrogance, and self-dictatorship, which is the vice of trying to control one\'s life to an excessive degree, and that a self-dictator fails to give due moral consideration to the future self\'s liberty or agency. I then introduce the Daoist idea of wu-wei, which recommends embracement of what happens in one\'s life, as one of the possible remedies for the overemphasis on the value of autonomy and control.

Ethical challenges for doctors and other health care professionals have existed since the practice of medicine began. Many of the oldest challenges live on to this day, such as who has more authority to make key decisions (autonomy vs. paternalism) and what are the boundaries of life at the beginning and at the end. Two powerful driving forces are new technologies and an ever-changing culture and society. The practice of medicine in intensive care units (ICUs) has been the source of many ethical challenges. Once firmly fixed concepts, such as death or \"brain death\" are now coming under increasing debate. In other areas, the concept of patient autonomy has been used to request life-prolonging therapies, once thought \"futile.\" New technologies for procreation have necessitated new ethical challenges as well. In this paper, we will use a series of cases, based on experiences from our hospital ethics committee, that occurred over the course of several years and illustrate ethical challenges which are either new to us or not new but growing in frequency due to technological or societal changes. Each one of these topics is complex and worthy of its own large review but for this overview, we will briefly discuss the key points of each dilemma.

Modern antiretroviral therapies (ART) are capable of suppressing HIV in the bloodstream to undetectable levels. Nonetheless, people living with HIV must maintain lifelong adherence to ART to avoid the re-emergence of the infection. So despite the existence and efficacy of ART, there is still substantial interest in development of a cure. But HIV cure trials can be risky, their success is as of yet unlikely, and the medical gain of being cured is limited against a baseline of ART access. The medical prospect associated with participation in cure research thus look poor. Are the risks and burdens that HIV cure research places on participants so high that it is unethical, at present, to conduct it? In this paper, I answer \'no\'. I start my argument by describing a foundational way of thinking about the ethical justification for regulatory limits on research risk; I then apply this way of thinking to HIV cure trials. In offering this analysis, I confine my attention to studies enrolling competent adults and I also do not consider risks research may pose to third parties or society. Rather, my concern is to engage with the thought that some trials are so risky that performing them is an ethically unacceptable way to treat the participants themselves. I reject this thought and instead argue that there is no level of risk, no matter how high, that inherently mistreats a participant.

Health-promoting nudges have been put into practice by different agents, in different contexts and with different aims. This article formulates a set of criteria that enables a thorough ethical evaluation of such nudges. As such, it bridges the gap between the abstract, theoretical debates among academics and the actual behavioral interventions being implemented in practice. The criteria are derived from arguments against nudges, which allegedly disrespect nudgees, as these would impose values on nudgees and/or violate their rationality and autonomy. Instead of interpreting these objections as knock-down arguments, I take them as expressing legitimate worries that can often be addressed. I analyze six prototypical nudge cases, such as Google\'s rearrangement of fridges and the use of defaults in organ donation registration. I show how the ethical criteria listed are satisfied by most-but not all-nudges in most-but not all-circumstances.

Animal-derived constituents are frequently used in anaesthesia and surgery, and patients are seldom informed of this. This is problematic for a growing minority of patients who may have religious or secular concerns about their use in their care. It is not currently common practice to inform patients about the use of animal-derived constituents, yet what little empirical data does exist indicates that many patients want the opportunity to give their informed consent.
First we review the nature and scale of the problem by looking at the groups who may have concerns about the use of animal-derived constituents in their care. We then summarise some of the products used in anaesthesia and surgery that can contain such constituents, such as anaesthetic drugs, surgical implants and dressings. Finally, we explore the problem of animal-derived constituents and consent using Beauchamp and Childress\' four principles approach, examining issues of autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence and justice. Disclosing the use of animal-derived constituents in anaesthesia and surgery is warranted under Beauchamp and Childress\' four principles approach to the problem. Although there exist systemic and practical challenges to implementing this in practice, the ethical case for doing so is strong. The Montgomery ruling presents additional legal reason for disclosure because it entails that patients must be made aware of risks associated with their treatment that they attach significance to.

Some women in a high-risk pregnancy go against medical advice and choose to birth at home with a \"holistic\" midwife. In this exploratory multiple case study, grounded theory and triangulation were employed to examine 10 cases. The women, their partners, and (regular and holistic) health care professionals were interviewed in an attempt to determine whether there was a pattern to their experiences. Two propositions emerged. The dominant one was a trajectory of trauma, self-education, concern about paternalism, and conflict leading to a negative choice for holistic care. The rival proposition was a path of trust and positive choice for holistic care without conflict. We discuss these two propositions and make suggestions for professionals for building a trusting relationship using continuity of care, true shared decision making, and an alternative risk discourse to achieve the goal of making women perceive the hospital as safe again.