Abstract：
It is often argued that certain metaphysical complications surrounding the phenomenon of monozygotic twinning force us to conclude that, prior to the point at which twinning is no longer possible, the zygote or early embryo cannot be considered an individual human organism. In this essay, I argue, on the contrary, that there are in fact several ways of making sense of monozygotic twinning that uphold the humanity of the original zygote, but also that there is no easy answer to what happens when the human zygote twins. All of the options available carry with them one or more surprising, alarming, or otherwise counterintuitive implications. All things considered, I conclude that the \"budding option,\" according to which the original human organism present before twinning carries on as one of the resulting embryos but not the other, is the most plausible explanation of what happens when a human zygote twins.
摘要：
人们经常认为，围绕单卵孪生现象的某些形而上学并发症迫使我们得出结论，在不再可能成对之前，受精卵或早期胚胎不能被认为是一个单独的人类有机体。在这篇文章中，我争辩说，相反,事实上，有几种方法可以理解单卵孪生，以维护原始受精卵的人性，但也没有简单的答案，当人类合子双胞胎会发生什么。所有可用的选项都带有一个或多个令人惊讶的选项，令人震惊，或其他违反直觉的暗示。考虑到所有的事情，我得出的结论是，“萌芽的选择，“根据这种说法，孪生前存在的原始人类有机体作为产生的胚胎之一而不是另一个，是人类合子双胞胎时发生的最合理的解释。
