Abstract：
In biomedical ethics, there is widespread acceptance of moral realism, the view that moral claims express a proposition and that at least some of these propositions are true. Biomedical ethics is also in the business of attributing moral obligations, such as \"S should do X.\" The problem, as we argue, is that against the background of moral realism, most of these attributions are erroneous or inaccurate. The typical obligation attribution issued by a biomedical ethicist fails to truly capture the person\'s actual obligations. We offer a novel argument for rife error in obligation attribution. The argument starts with the idea of an epistemic burden. Epistemic burdens are all of those epistemic obstacles one must surmount in order to achieve some aim. Epistemic burdens shape decision-making such that given two otherwise equal options, a person will choose the option that has the lesser of epistemic burdens. Epistemic burdens determine one\'s potential obligations and, conversely, their non-obligations. The problem for biomedical ethics is that ethicists have little to no access to others\' epistemic burdens. Given this lack of access and the fact that epistemic burdens determine potential obligations, biomedical ethicists often can only attribute accurate obligations out of luck. This suggests that the practice of attributing obligations in biomedical ethics is rife with error. To resolve this widespread error, we argue that this practice should be abolished from the discourse of biomedical ethics.
摘要：
在生物医学伦理学中，人们普遍接受道德现实主义，认为道德主张表达了一个命题，并且至少其中一些命题是正确的。生物医学伦理学也在归因道德义务，例如“S应该做X。”问题，正如我们争论的那样，在道德现实主义的背景下，这些归因大多是错误的或不准确的。生物医学伦理学家发布的典型义务归因未能真正捕捉到人的实际义务。我们为义务归属中的普遍错误提供了一个新颖的论据。争论从认知负担的概念开始。认识论负担是人们为了实现某些目标必须克服的所有认识论障碍。认识论负担决定了决策，使得给定两个否则相等的选择，一个人会选择认知负担较小的选项。认识负担决定了一个人的潜在义务，相反,他们的非义务。生物医学伦理学的问题在于，伦理学家几乎无法接触到他人的“认知负担”。鉴于这种缺乏机会以及认知负担决定潜在义务的事实，生物医学伦理学家常常只能将准确的义务归因于运气。这表明，在生物医学伦理学中归因义务的做法普遍存在错误。为了解决这个普遍的错误，我们认为这种做法应该从生物医学伦理学的论述中废除。
