Abstract：
The Database of Exemplars (DOE) account of moral cognition emerged in part to explain how wrongless harms could arise (Royzman & Borislow, 2022; henceforth, RB) in spite of being denied by most traditional models (Schein & Gray, 2018; Turiel, 1983; Shweder, 1997; Haidt, 2012). Herein, we defend this account against a set of results that have been claimed to disprove it (Kurthy & Sousa, this issue; henceforth, KS). We argue that DOE is in line with all the findings KS perceive as uniquely supportive of their own account (appraising an act as unjust engenders a judgment of wrong) while RB\'s findings (Royzman & Borislow, 2022, Studies 2 and 3) do challenge KS under varied conceptions of what it would take for an agent to be or appear unjust in his or her treatment of others, affirming that wrongless injustice is an empirical fact that one must strive to explain and that DOE helps us explain.
摘要：
道德认知的范例数据库(DOE)账户的出现在一定程度上解释了错误的伤害是如何产生的(Royzman&Borislow，2022年；此后，RB)尽管被大多数传统模式(Schein&Gray，2018；Turiel，1983；Shweder，1997年；海特，2012).在这里，我们为这一说法辩护，反对一系列声称反驳它的结果(Kurthy&Sousa，这个问题；从今以后，KS).我们认为DOE与KS认为的所有发现都是一致的(评估一个不公正的行为会导致错误的判断)，而RB的发现(Royzman&Borislow，2022年，研究2和3）确实在不同的概念下挑战KS，即代理人在对待他人时会成为或显得不公正，确认错误的不公正是一个经验事实，人们必须努力解释，DOE帮助我们解释。
