Abstract：
Householders are increasingly responsible for managing residual flood risk at property level. Yet, consumers are observed to adopt irrational behaviors under scenarios of risk, often making suboptimal decisions. Therefore, the question is raised, if householders are required to manage flood risk at household level, how can this be made fair and efficient? Policy instruments often incorporate \"fairness\" by subsidizing the costs of mitigation options, assuming a linear relationship between available finances and the uptake of risk mitigation measures. To integrate behavior into the assessment of policy instruments, this article develops a method to compare the uptake of flood mitigation between agents following models of Expected Monetary Value (EMV) and Prospect Theory (PT). An agent-based model is created, offering the option to apply either EMV or PT frameworks. EMV represents a rational gamble, determining whether an agent \"should\" invest in insurance or property-level protection. On the other hand, the PT option incorporates behavioral aspects to examine how agents are likely to respond to investment decisions in flood risk environments. The models are applied to Flood Re, a policy aimed at ensuring affordable insurance access for all individuals in flood risk areas. The results demonstrate that PT models exhibit greater similarity to observed behavior compared to models based on EMV. These findings emphasize the importance of accommodating \"irrational\" behaviors within the design of policy instruments, promoting fairness and efficiency. Overall, this research provides insights into the integration of behavior in policy assessments and highlights the benefits of considering PT frameworks alongside traditional rational models. By understanding and accounting for human behavior in decision-making processes, policymakers can design more effective and equitable policy instruments for managing flood risk.
摘要：
住户越来越多地负责管理房地产层面的剩余洪水风险。然而，观察到消费者在风险情景下采取非理性行为，经常做出次优决策。因此,提出了问题，如果要求住户在家庭层面管理洪水风险，如何做到公平和有效？政策工具通常通过补贴缓解方案的成本来纳入“公平”，假设可用资金与风险缓解措施的采纳之间存在线性关系。将行为纳入政策工具的评估,本文开发了一种方法来比较遵循预期货币价值（EMV）和前景理论（PT）模型的代理商之间的防洪吸收。创建基于代理的模型，提供应用EMV或PT框架的选项。EMV代表着理性的赌博,确定代理人“应该”投资于保险还是财产级保护。另一方面,PT选项包含行为方面，以检查代理商如何可能对洪水风险环境中的投资决策做出反应。这些模型应用于洪水Re，一项旨在确保洪水风险地区所有个人都能负担得起的保险的政策。结果表明，与基于EMV的模型相比，PT模型与观察到的行为表现出更大的相似性。这些发现强调了在政策工具设计中容纳“非理性”行为的重要性，促进公平和效率。总的来说,这项研究提供了对政策评估中行为整合的见解，并强调了将PT框架与传统理性模型一起考虑的好处。通过理解和核算决策过程中的人类行为，政策制定者可以设计更有效和公平的政策工具来管理洪水风险。
