PDF(Pubmed)
Abstract：
In order to accelerate the development of smart agriculture and realize the green transformation of agriculture, the coupling of prospect theory and evolutionary game theory is introduced. Construct a two-party evolutionary game model for the adoption of intelligent spray technology in farmers\' cooperatives, analyze the evolution of farmers\' cooperatives and government strategy selection and its influencing factors according to the replication dynamic equation, and conduct numerical simulation experiments through Matlab software. The results show that the adoption of intelligent spray technology by farmers\' cooperatives and the government\'s choice of subsidies are the two optimal stable states of the evolutionary system. The government\'s subsidy policy can effectively stimulate farmers\' cooperatives to adopt intelligent spray technology, but when the government subsidy coefficient is greater than or equal to 70%, the decision-making evolution of the government and farmers\' cooperatives is unstable. The increase in farmers\' awareness of pesticide hazards, the scale of operation of farmers\' cooperatives, the price of high-quality agricultural products, and the sensitivity of farmers\' cooperatives to profits and losses contribute to the promotion of intelligent spray technology, and the damage probability of intelligent spray technology has a restraining effect.
摘要：
为加快智慧农业发展,实现农业绿色转型,介绍了前景理论与演化博弈理论的耦合。构建了农民合作社采用智能喷雾技术的两方进化博弈模型，根据复制动态方程分析农民合作社的演化和政府策略选择及其影响因素，并通过Matlab软件进行数值仿真实验。结果表明,农户合作社采用智能喷雾技术和政府对补贴的选择是该进化系统的两个最优稳定状态。政府的补贴政策可以有效刺激农民合作社采用智能喷雾技术,但是当政府补贴系数大于或等于70%时，政府和农民合作社的决策演变是不稳定的。农民对农药危害认识的提高，农民合作社的经营规模，优质农产品的价格，农民合作社对利润和损失的敏感性有助于智能喷雾技术的推广，智能喷雾技术的损伤概率具有一定的抑制作用。
