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Abstract：
Philosophical and theoretical debates on the multiple realisability of the cognitive have historically influenced discussions of the possible systems capable of instantiating complex functions like memory, learning, goal-directedness, and decision-making. These debates have had the corollary of undermining, if not altogether neglecting, the materiality and corporeality of cognition-treating material, living processes as \"hardware\" problems that can be abstracted out and, in principle, implemented in a variety of materials-in particular on digital computers and in the form of state-of-the-art neural networks. In sum, the matter in se has been taken not to matter for cognition. However, in this paper, we argue that the materiality of cognition-and the living, self-organizing processes that it enables-requires a more detailed assessment when understanding the nature of cognition and recreating it in the field of embodied robotics. Or, in slogan form, that the matter matters for cognitive form and function. We pull from the fields of Active Matter Physics, Soft Robotics, and Basal Cognition literature to suggest that the imbrication between material and cognitive processes is closer than standard accounts of multiple realisability suggest. In light of this, we propose upgrading the notion of multiple realisability from the standard version-what we call 1.0-to a more nuanced conception 2.0 to better reflect the recent empirical advancements, while at the same time averting many of the problems that have been raised for it. These fields are actively reshaping the terrain in which we understand materiality and how it enables, mediates, and constrains cognition. We propose that taking the materiality of our embodied, precarious nature seriously furnishes an important research avenue for the development of embodied robots that autonomously value, engage, and interact with the environment in a goal-directed manner, in response to existential needs of survival, persistence, and, ultimately, reproduction. Thus, we argue that by placing further emphasis on the soft, active, and plastic nature of the materials that constitute cognitive embodiment, we can move further in the direction of autonomous embodied robots and Artificial Intelligence.
摘要：
关于认知的多种可实现性的哲学和理论辩论在历史上影响了对能够实例化诸如记忆之类的复杂功能的可能系统的讨论，学习,目标直接性，和决策。这些辩论的必然结果是破坏，如果不是完全忽视，认知处理材料的物质性和物质性，生活过程作为“硬件”问题，可以抽象出来，原则上,在各种材料中实现，特别是在数字计算机上，并以最先进的神经网络的形式实现。总之,在本质上，这个问题被认为不是认知的问题。然而,在本文中，我们认为认知和生活的物质性，它能够实现的自组织过程需要更详细的评估，当理解认知的本质并在具体机器人领域重新创建它。或者，以口号的形式，物质对认知形式和功能很重要。我们从活动物质物理领域中抽出，软机器人,和基础认知文献表明，材料和认知过程之间的融合比多个可实现性的标准帐户更接近。鉴于此,我们建议将多重可实现性的概念从标准版-我们称之为1.0-升级到更细致入微的概念2.0，以更好地反映最近的经验进步，同时避免了为此提出的许多问题。这些领域正在积极地重塑我们理解重要性的地形，以及它是如何实现的，调解,并限制了认知。我们建议以我们体现的物质为基础，岌岌可危的性质为开发自主价值的具体化机器人提供了重要的研究途径，engage,以目标导向的方式与环境互动，为了满足生存的需要，持久性,and,最终,繁殖。因此，我们认为，通过进一步强调软，活跃,和构成认知体现的材料的可塑性，我们可以朝着自主机器人和人工智能的方向进一步发展。
