Abstract：
The integrated information theory of consciousness (IIT) is divisive: while some believe it provides an unprecedentedly powerful approach to address the \'hard problem\', others dismiss it on grounds that it is untestable. We argue that the appeal and applicability of IIT can be greatly widened if we distinguish two flavours of the theory: strong IIT, which identifies consciousness with specific properties associated with maxima of integrated information; and weak IIT, which tests pragmatic hypotheses relating aspects of consciousness to broader measures of information dynamics. We review challenges for strong IIT, explain how existing empirical findings are well explained by weak IIT without needing to commit to the entirety of strong IIT, and discuss the outlook for both flavours of IIT.
摘要：
意识的综合信息理论（IIT）是分裂的：尽管有些人认为它提供了前所未有的强大方法来解决“难题”，其他人则以无法测试为由驳回了它。我们认为，如果我们区分两种理论：强IIT，IIT的吸引力和适用性可以大大扩大。它识别具有与综合信息最大值相关的特定属性的意识；和弱IIT，它测试了将意识方面与更广泛的信息动态度量相关的务实假设。我们回顾了强大IIT的挑战，解释现有的实证结果是如何被弱IIT很好地解释的，而不需要致力于强IIT的整体，并讨论两种类型的IIT前景。
