%0 Journal Article
%T Updating Prospective Self-Efficacy Beliefs About Cardiac Interoception in Anorexia Nervosa: An Experimental and Computational Study.
%A Saramandi A
%A Crucianelli L
%A Koukoutsakis A
%A Nisticò V
%A Mavromara L
%A Goeta D
%A Boido G
%A Gonidakis F
%A Demartini B
%A Bertelli S
%A Gambini O
%A Jenkinson PM
%A Fotopoulou A
%J Comput Psychiatr
%V 8
%N 1
%D 2024
%M 38948255
暂无%R 10.5334/cpsy.109
%X Patients with anorexia nervosa (AN) typically hold altered beliefs about their body that they struggle to update, including global, prospective beliefs about their ability to know and regulate their body and particularly their interoceptive states. While clinical questionnaire studies have provided ample evidence on the role of such beliefs in the onset, maintenance, and treatment of AN, psychophysical studies have typically focused on perceptual and 'local' beliefs. Across two experiments, we examined how women at the acute AN (N = 86) and post-acute AN state (N = 87), compared to matched healthy controls (N = 180) formed and updated their self-efficacy beliefs retrospectively (Experiment 1) and prospectively (Experiment 2) about their heartbeat counting abilities in an adapted heartbeat counting task. As preregistered, while AN patients did not differ from controls in interoceptive accuracy per se, they hold and maintain 'pessimistic' interoceptive, metacognitive self-efficacy beliefs after performance. Modelling using a simplified computational Bayesian learning framework showed that neither local evidence from performance, nor retrospective beliefs following that performance (that themselves were suboptimally updated) seem to be sufficient to counter and update pessimistic, self-efficacy beliefs in AN. AN patients showed lower learning rates than controls, revealing a tendency to base their posterior beliefs more on prior beliefs rather than prediction errors in both retrospective and prospective belief updating. Further explorations showed that while these differences in both explicit beliefs, and the latent mechanisms of belief updating, were not explained by general cognitive flexibility differences, they were explained by negative mood comorbidity, even after the acute stage of illness.