PDF(Pubmed)
Abstract：
UNASSIGNED: Given the role of commercial determinants on sugar consumption and health, this study aimed to describe lobbying practices of the ultra-processed sugary food and drinks industries in Chile between 2014 and 2022.
UNASSIGNED: Official meetings between ultra-processed sugary food and drinks industries and related commercial actors and Chilean government officials were obtained from the Chilean Lobby Registry. Relevant commercial names were initially identified based on their market share and expanded iteratively based on information from relevant meetings. Qualitative analysis followed a deductive-inductive approach using the Corporate Political Activity Model to identify and classify objectives, framing and action strategies.
UNASSIGNED: From 237 records identified, the Ministries of Health, Social Development, and Economy were the most frequently lobbied. Industry representatives sought to achieve their short- and long-term objectives by targeting a diverse range of authorities, including Ministers and Under-secretaries, using different strategies. Framing strategies focused on presenting sugary food and drinks industries as socially responsible and legitimate policy actors and criticised public health initiatives as \'bad solutions\'. Action strategies aimed to influence policymaking and nurture corporate reputations.
UNASSIGNED: Extensive lobbying took place by the sugary food and drinks industries between 2014 and 2022, a period when major public health policies were being discussed in Chile. Lobbying strategies varied to meet industry objectives and targeted a diverse range of government institutions including high-ranking officials. Tighter regulations to stop inappropriate industry influence in public health policymaking are urgently required.
UNASSIGNED: Agencia Nacional de Investigación y Desarrollo (Chile)-PhD Scholarship. University College London-Open Access fees.
UNASSIGNED: Official meetings between ultra-processed sugary food and drinks industries and related commercial actors and Chilean government officials were obtained from the Chilean Lobby Registry. Relevant commercial names were initially identified based on their market share and expanded iteratively based on information from relevant meetings. Qualitative analysis followed a deductive-inductive approach using the Corporate Political Activity Model to identify and classify objectives, framing and action strategies.
UNASSIGNED: From 237 records identified, the Ministries of Health, Social Development, and Economy were the most frequently lobbied. Industry representatives sought to achieve their short- and long-term objectives by targeting a diverse range of authorities, including Ministers and Under-secretaries, using different strategies. Framing strategies focused on presenting sugary food and drinks industries as socially responsible and legitimate policy actors and criticised public health initiatives as \'bad solutions\'. Action strategies aimed to influence policymaking and nurture corporate reputations.
UNASSIGNED: Extensive lobbying took place by the sugary food and drinks industries between 2014 and 2022, a period when major public health policies were being discussed in Chile. Lobbying strategies varied to meet industry objectives and targeted a diverse range of government institutions including high-ranking officials. Tighter regulations to stop inappropriate industry influence in public health policymaking are urgently required.
UNASSIGNED: Agencia Nacional de Investigación y Desarrollo (Chile)-PhD Scholarship. University College London-Open Access fees.
摘要：
■考虑到商业决定因素对糖消费和健康的作用，这项研究旨在描述2014年至2022年间智利超加工含糖食品和饮料行业的游说行为.
■超加工含糖食品和饮料行业与相关商业行为者和智利政府官员之间的正式会议是从智利大厅登记处获得的。相关商业名称最初是根据其市场份额确定的，并根据相关会议的信息反复扩展。定性分析遵循演绎归纳的方法，使用公司政治活动模型来识别和分类目标，框架和行动策略。
■从确定的237条记录中，卫生部,社会发展,和经济是最经常游说的。行业代表通过针对各种当局寻求实现其短期和长期目标，包括部长和副部长，使用不同的策略。框架策略的重点是将含糖食品和饮料行业视为对社会负责和合法的政策参与者，并批评公共卫生举措为“不良解决方案”。旨在影响政策制定和培养公司声誉的行动策略。
■在2014年至2022年期间，含糖食品和饮料行业进行了广泛的游说，这一时期智利正在讨论主要的公共卫生政策。游说策略多种多样，以实现行业目标，并针对包括高级官员在内的各种政府机构。迫切需要更严格的法规，以制止公共卫生政策制定中不适当的行业影响。
■国家研究机构（智利）-博士奖学金。伦敦大学学院-开放获取费用。
■超加工含糖食品和饮料行业与相关商业行为者和智利政府官员之间的正式会议是从智利大厅登记处获得的。相关商业名称最初是根据其市场份额确定的，并根据相关会议的信息反复扩展。定性分析遵循演绎归纳的方法，使用公司政治活动模型来识别和分类目标，框架和行动策略。
■从确定的237条记录中，卫生部,社会发展,和经济是最经常游说的。行业代表通过针对各种当局寻求实现其短期和长期目标，包括部长和副部长，使用不同的策略。框架策略的重点是将含糖食品和饮料行业视为对社会负责和合法的政策参与者，并批评公共卫生举措为“不良解决方案”。旨在影响政策制定和培养公司声誉的行动策略。
■在2014年至2022年期间，含糖食品和饮料行业进行了广泛的游说，这一时期智利正在讨论主要的公共卫生政策。游说策略多种多样，以实现行业目标，并针对包括高级官员在内的各种政府机构。迫切需要更严格的法规，以制止公共卫生政策制定中不适当的行业影响。
■国家研究机构（智利）-博士奖学金。伦敦大学学院-开放获取费用。
