PDF(Pubmed)
Abstract：
To start with an infinitely repeated game of supply chains of public goods, a stout reciprocity mechanism is introduced into income games to build a matric dynamic equation. The conventional evolutionary game method is employed to propose a model called the evolutionary game for the cooperative strategy of both the manufacturer and the seller groups in the supply chain of public goods. Also, white Gaussian noise (WGN) is added to reflect random interference in the evolution process. Then, a stochastic dynamic system is established, and Ito\'s differential equation is used to analyze both sides\' strategy evolution in a game, interpret changes in system stability when random disturbance is added, and finally test the influence of different situations on the system stability by running a numerical simulation. The research shows that the stronger the reciprocity coefficient is, and the system is subjected to random interference, the greater the strategy choice change in players\' decision-making procedures when the repeated game of public goods is conducted.
摘要：
从公共产品供应链的无限重复博弈开始，在收入博弈中引入严格的互惠机制，建立了矩阵动态方程。采用传统的进化博弈方法，为公共产品供应链中制造商和卖方群体的合作策略提出了一个称为进化博弈的模型。此外，在演化过程中加入高斯白噪声(WGN)来反映随机干扰。然后，建立了一个随机动态系统，伊藤的微分方程用于分析博弈中双方的策略演变，解释当添加随机干扰时系统稳定性的变化，最后通过数值模拟测试了不同情况对系统稳定性的影响。研究表明,互易系数越强,并且系统受到随机干扰，进行公共物品重复博弈时，玩家决策程序的策略选择变化越大。
