PDF(Pubmed)
Abstract：
Despite unresolved questions about replicability, a substantial number of studies find that disgust influences and arises from evaluations of immoral behavior and people. Departing from prior emphases, the current research examines a novel, related question: Are people who are viewed as disgusting (i.e., people whose habits seem disgusting) perceived as more immoral than typical or unusual people? Four experiments examined this, also exploring the downstream impacts of moral character judgments. Adults who seemed disgusting were regarded as more immoral for purity and non-purity violations (Experiment 1) and less praiseworthy for prosocial acts (Experiment 2). In Experiment 3, an 8-year-old with typical (but seemingly disgusting) habits was rated as \"naughtier\" and likelier to misbehave than an atypical child who loved vegetables and disliked sweets. Experiment 4 revealed how, when no behavioral information is available, beliefs about target disgust influence beliefs about future behavior, helping explain why seemingly disgusting targets are viewed as more immoral, but not always more punishable for their bad behavior.
摘要：
尽管关于可复制性的问题尚未解决，大量的研究发现，厌恶的影响和产生的不道德行为和人的评价。与以前的重点不同，当前的研究考察了一部小说，相关问题：被视为令人厌恶的人(即，习惯看起来令人作呕的人）被认为比典型或不寻常的人更不道德？四个实验检查了这一点，还探索了道德品质判断的下游影响。看起来令人作呕的成年人被认为对纯洁和非纯洁的侵犯更不道德（实验1），而对亲社会行为则不那么值得称赞（实验2）。在实验3中，一个8岁的孩子有典型的（但看起来很恶心）习惯，被评为“更淘气”，比一个不喜欢蔬菜和不喜欢甜食的非典型孩子更有可能行为不端。实验4揭示了如何，当没有行为信息可用时，对目标厌恶的信念会影响对未来行为的信念，帮助解释为什么看似恶心的目标被认为更不道德，但并不总是因为他们的不良行为而受到更多惩罚。
