PDF(Pubmed)
Abstract：
OBJECTIVE: To assess trends in hospital price disclosures after the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) Final Rule went into effect.
METHODS: The Turquoise Health Price Transparency Dataset was used to identify all US hospitals that publicly displayed pricing from 2021 to 2023.
METHODS: Price-disclosing versus nondisclosing hospitals were compared using Pearson\'s Chi-squared and Wilcoxon rank sum tests. Bayesian structural time-series modeling was used to determine if enforcement of increased penalties for nondisclosure was associated with a change in the trend of hospital disclosures.
METHODS: Not applicable.
RESULTS: As of January 2023, 5162 of 6692 (77.1%) US hospitals disclosed pricing of their services, with the majority (2794 of 5162 [54.1%]) reporting their pricing within the first 6 months of the final rule going into effect in January 2021. An increase in hospital disclosures was observed after penalties for nondisclosure were enforced in January 2022 (relative effect size 20%, p = 0.002). Compared with nondisclosing hospitals, disclosing hospitals had higher annual revenue, bed number, and were more likely to be have nonprofit ownership, academic affiliation, provide emergency services, and be in highly concentrated markets (p < 0.001).
CONCLUSIONS: Hospital pricing disclosures are continuously in flux and influenced by regulatory and market factors.
METHODS: The Turquoise Health Price Transparency Dataset was used to identify all US hospitals that publicly displayed pricing from 2021 to 2023.
METHODS: Price-disclosing versus nondisclosing hospitals were compared using Pearson\'s Chi-squared and Wilcoxon rank sum tests. Bayesian structural time-series modeling was used to determine if enforcement of increased penalties for nondisclosure was associated with a change in the trend of hospital disclosures.
METHODS: Not applicable.
RESULTS: As of January 2023, 5162 of 6692 (77.1%) US hospitals disclosed pricing of their services, with the majority (2794 of 5162 [54.1%]) reporting their pricing within the first 6 months of the final rule going into effect in January 2021. An increase in hospital disclosures was observed after penalties for nondisclosure were enforced in January 2022 (relative effect size 20%, p = 0.002). Compared with nondisclosing hospitals, disclosing hospitals had higher annual revenue, bed number, and were more likely to be have nonprofit ownership, academic affiliation, provide emergency services, and be in highly concentrated markets (p < 0.001).
CONCLUSIONS: Hospital pricing disclosures are continuously in flux and influenced by regulatory and market factors.
摘要：
目的：评估医疗保险和医疗补助服务中心（CMS）最终规则生效后医院价格披露的趋势。
方法：绿松石健康价格透明度数据集用于识别2021年至2023年公开显示定价的所有美国医院。
方法：使用Pearson卡方检验和Wilcoxon秩和检验比较了价格披露和非披露医院。贝叶斯结构时间序列模型用于确定对未披露的处罚增加的执行是否与医院披露趋势的变化有关。
方法：不适用。
结果：截至2023年1月，美国6692家医院中有5162家（77.1％）披露了其服务的定价，大多数人(5162人中的2794人[54.1%])在2021年1月最终规则生效的前6个月内报告了他们的定价。2022年1月实施不披露处罚后，医院披露增加(相对影响大小20%，p=0.002)。与不公开的医院相比，披露医院的年收入更高，床号,更有可能拥有非营利所有权，学术隶属关系，提供紧急服务,并处于高度集中的市场(p<0.001)。
结论：医院的定价披露不断变化，并受到监管和市场因素的影响。
方法：绿松石健康价格透明度数据集用于识别2021年至2023年公开显示定价的所有美国医院。
方法：使用Pearson卡方检验和Wilcoxon秩和检验比较了价格披露和非披露医院。贝叶斯结构时间序列模型用于确定对未披露的处罚增加的执行是否与医院披露趋势的变化有关。
方法：不适用。
结果：截至2023年1月，美国6692家医院中有5162家（77.1％）披露了其服务的定价，大多数人(5162人中的2794人[54.1%])在2021年1月最终规则生效的前6个月内报告了他们的定价。2022年1月实施不披露处罚后，医院披露增加(相对影响大小20%，p=0.002)。与不公开的医院相比，披露医院的年收入更高，床号,更有可能拥有非营利所有权，学术隶属关系，提供紧急服务,并处于高度集中的市场(p<0.001)。
结论：医院的定价披露不断变化，并受到监管和市场因素的影响。
