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Abstract：
OBJECTIVE: To assess the influence of supply and demand factors on the contract behavior of occupational populations with general practitioner (GP) teams.
METHODS: We employed a system dynamics approach to assess and predict the effect of the general practitioner service package (GPSP) and complementary incentive policies on the contract rate for 2015-2030. First, the GPSP is designed to address the unique needs of occupational populations, enhancing the attractiveness of GP contracting services, including three personalized service contents tailored to demand-side considerations: work-related disease prevention (WDP), health education & counseling (HEC), and health-care service (HCS). Second, the complementary incentive policies on the supply-side included income incentives (II), job title promotion (JTP), and education & training (ET). Considering the team collaboration, the income distribution ratio (IDR) was also incorporated into supply-side factors.
RESULTS: The contract rate is predicted to increase to 57.8% by 2030 after the GPSP intervention, representing a 15.4% increase on the non-intervention scenario. WDP and HEC have a slightly higher (by 2%) impact on the contract rate than that from HCS. Regarding the supply-side policies, II have a more significant impact on the contract rate than JTP and ET by 3-5%. The maximum predicted contract rate of 75.2% is expected by 2030 when the IDR is 0.5, i.e., the GP receives 50% of the contract income and other members share 50%.
CONCLUSIONS: The GP service package favorably increased the contract rate among occupational population, particularly after integrating the incentive policies. Specifically, for a given demand level, the targeted content of the package enhanced the attractiveness of contract services. On the supply side, the incentive policies boost GPs\' motivation, and the income distribution motivated other team members.
METHODS: We employed a system dynamics approach to assess and predict the effect of the general practitioner service package (GPSP) and complementary incentive policies on the contract rate for 2015-2030. First, the GPSP is designed to address the unique needs of occupational populations, enhancing the attractiveness of GP contracting services, including three personalized service contents tailored to demand-side considerations: work-related disease prevention (WDP), health education & counseling (HEC), and health-care service (HCS). Second, the complementary incentive policies on the supply-side included income incentives (II), job title promotion (JTP), and education & training (ET). Considering the team collaboration, the income distribution ratio (IDR) was also incorporated into supply-side factors.
RESULTS: The contract rate is predicted to increase to 57.8% by 2030 after the GPSP intervention, representing a 15.4% increase on the non-intervention scenario. WDP and HEC have a slightly higher (by 2%) impact on the contract rate than that from HCS. Regarding the supply-side policies, II have a more significant impact on the contract rate than JTP and ET by 3-5%. The maximum predicted contract rate of 75.2% is expected by 2030 when the IDR is 0.5, i.e., the GP receives 50% of the contract income and other members share 50%.
CONCLUSIONS: The GP service package favorably increased the contract rate among occupational population, particularly after integrating the incentive policies. Specifically, for a given demand level, the targeted content of the package enhanced the attractiveness of contract services. On the supply side, the incentive policies boost GPs\' motivation, and the income distribution motivated other team members.
摘要：
目的：评估供需因素对全科医生（GP）团队职业人群合同行为的影响。
方法：我们采用系统动力学方法来评估和预测2015-2030年全科医生服务包（GPSP）和补充激励政策对合同费率的影响。首先,GPSP旨在满足职业人群的独特需求，提高全科医生签约服务的吸引力，包括三个针对需求方考虑的个性化服务内容：与工作有关的疾病预防（WDP），健康教育和咨询（HEC），医疗保健服务（HCS）。第二,供给侧的补充性激励政策包括收入激励(二)，职称晋升（JTP），教育和培训（ET）。考虑到团队协作，收入分配率(IDR)也被纳入供应方因素。
结果：GPSP干预后，合同率预计到2030年将增加到57.8％，代表非干预方案增加15.4%。WDP和HEC对合同费率的影响略高于HCS（2％）。关于供给侧政策，II对合约利率的影响比JTP和ET大3-5%。预计到2030年，当IDR为0.5时，最高预测合同率为75.2%，即GP获得合同收入的50%，其他成员分享50%。
结论：GP服务包有利地提高了职业人群的合同率，特别是在整合激励政策之后。具体来说,对于给定的需求水平，套餐的针对性内容增强了合同服务的吸引力。在供应方面,激励政策提高了全科医生的积极性，收入分配激励了其他团队成员。
方法：我们采用系统动力学方法来评估和预测2015-2030年全科医生服务包（GPSP）和补充激励政策对合同费率的影响。首先,GPSP旨在满足职业人群的独特需求，提高全科医生签约服务的吸引力，包括三个针对需求方考虑的个性化服务内容：与工作有关的疾病预防（WDP），健康教育和咨询（HEC），医疗保健服务（HCS）。第二,供给侧的补充性激励政策包括收入激励(二)，职称晋升（JTP），教育和培训（ET）。考虑到团队协作，收入分配率(IDR)也被纳入供应方因素。
结果：GPSP干预后，合同率预计到2030年将增加到57.8％，代表非干预方案增加15.4%。WDP和HEC对合同费率的影响略高于HCS（2％）。关于供给侧政策，II对合约利率的影响比JTP和ET大3-5%。预计到2030年，当IDR为0.5时，最高预测合同率为75.2%，即GP获得合同收入的50%，其他成员分享50%。
结论：GP服务包有利地提高了职业人群的合同率，特别是在整合激励政策之后。具体来说,对于给定的需求水平，套餐的针对性内容增强了合同服务的吸引力。在供应方面,激励政策提高了全科医生的积极性，收入分配激励了其他团队成员。
