Abstract：
Corruption is known to be one of the real life situations which may jeopardize the effectiveness of fines in deterring crime. We present a model of \'crime with corruption\' by which both the dilution of crime deterrence due to corruption, as well as the possibility of crime encouraging fines, are formally highlighted. More importantly, by running an experiment on a subject pool of students for the case of illegal waste disposal, we provide experimental evidence on the validity of our theoretical predictions. We find that increasing fine rate may become crime encouraging, or at least ineffective, beyond a context-specific fine threshold. From a policy perspective, we suggest that the optimal design of a crime-deterring sanctioning system must simultaneously account for both corruption practices and anti-corruption policies.
摘要：
众所周知，腐败是现实生活中可能危及罚款在遏制犯罪方面的效力的情况之一。我们提出了一个“腐败犯罪”的模型，通过该模型既可以稀释腐败造成的犯罪威慑，以及犯罪鼓励罚款的可能性，正式强调。更重要的是,通过对一个学生群体进行非法废物处理的实验，我们为我们的理论预测的有效性提供了实验证据。我们发现提高罚款率可能会成为令人鼓舞的犯罪，或者至少是无效的,超出上下文特定的罚款阈值。从政策的角度来看,我们建议，遏制犯罪制裁系统的最佳设计必须同时考虑腐败行为和反腐败政策。
