Abstract:
UNASSIGNED: Chalfin and Kaplan attend to the problem of police misconduct with a series of simulation analyses that leverage data on complaints and uses of force in the Chicago Police Department. They conclude that incapacitating officers has minimal effects on misconduct and that, given political constraints, policy makers may prefer broader reforms around accountability and management to removing \"bad apples\". In this comment, we argue that this conclusion and its policy implications are characterized by \"incredible certitude\" driven by a selective focus on a subset of their full simulation results and inadequate incorporation of network spillovers into their analysis.
UNASSIGNED: Contrary to CK\'s conclusions, their preferred estimates of the effect of incapacitating \"bad apples\" on misconduct are squarely within the range of other interventions aimed at reducing police complaints and use of force. Once network spillovers are accounted for, estimates are up to five times as large. We conclude with a discussion of how even small reductions in misconduct can have outsized benefits as measured in both dollars and human suffering, and argue that the removal of problem officers is a normative good that should be pursued on moral grounds.
摘要:
■Chalfin和Kaplan通过一系列模拟分析来解决警察不当行为的问题,这些分析利用了芝加哥警察局投诉和使用武力的数据。他们得出结论,丧失行为能力的官员对不当行为的影响很小,鉴于政治限制,政策制定者可能更喜欢围绕问责制和管理进行更广泛的改革,而不是消除“坏苹果”。在这篇评论中,我们认为,这一结论及其政策含义的特点是“令人难以置信的确定性”,这是由选择性地关注其完整模拟结果的子集以及网络溢出效应不足以纳入其分析中所驱动的。
■与CK的结论相反,他们对丧失能力的“坏苹果”对不当行为的影响的首选估计完全在旨在减少警察投诉和使用武力的其他干预措施的范围内。一旦网络溢出被考虑在内,估计高达五倍。最后,我们讨论了即使是少量减少不当行为也能带来巨大的利益,以美元和人类痛苦来衡量,并争辩说,罢免问题官员是一种规范的利益,应该基于道德理由来追求。