Abstract:
This paper examines the tradeoffs of monitoring for wasteful public spending. By penalizing unnecessary spending, monitoring improves the quality of public expenditure and incentivizes firms to invest in compliance technology. I study a large Medicare program that monitored for unnecessary healthcare spending and consider its effect on government savings, provider behavior, and patient health. Every dollar Medicare spent on monitoring generated $24-29 in government savings. The majority of savings stem from the deterrence of future care, rather than reclaimed payments from prior care. I do not find evidence that the health of the marginal patient is harmed, indicating that monitoring primarily deters low-value care. Monitoring does increase provider administrative costs, but these costs are mostly incurred upfront and include investments in technology to assess the medical necessity of care.
摘要:
本文研究了监督浪费性公共支出的权衡。通过惩罚不必要的支出,监控提高了公共支出的质量,并激励公司投资于合规技术。我研究了一项大型医疗保险计划,该计划监控了不必要的医疗保健支出,并考虑了其对政府储蓄的影响,提供者行为,和病人的健康。医疗保险在监测上花费的每一美元都会产生24-29美元的政府储蓄。大部分储蓄来自未来护理的威慑,而不是从先前的护理中收回付款。我没有发现边缘患者的健康受到损害的证据,表明监测主要阻止低价值护理。监控确实增加了提供商的管理成本,但这些费用大多是前期发生的,包括评估医疗护理必要性的技术投资。