Abstract：
China has adopted a national carbon emissions trading market to promote emission reductions, but until now, overallocation of allowances suffer low carbon prices and thus to unfulfilled emission reduction goals. We report a general equilibrium modeling that indicates the flexible compliance and price adjustment mechanism of the carbon market, along with explores the solution to the oversupply of allowances in the China\'s national carbon market. We find that, under the current policy, the initial loose allowance allocation decreases the overall carbon price, and simultaneously the total amount of banked carbon allowances reaches 4.880 billion tons in 2030, resulting in the level of carbon price cannot achieve NDC (Nationally Determined Contribution) targets. However, by introducing carbon market price adjustment schemes, we observe that the cumulative amount of allowances can effectively reduce, enabling the carbon price rising. Importantly, the amount of the supply of allowances decreases most under the benchmark decrease scenario, which increases the emission reduction pressure of the enterprises from the beginning, leading to the largest economic losses, the price-based adjustment mechanism raises the carbon price to expected level at the minimize economic losses, and the quantity-based adjustment mechanism is more sensitive to policy parameters compared to the price -based adjustment mechanism. These findings offer a promising avenue for selecting cost-effective price adjustment mechanism to improve price mechanism design for national carbon markets.
摘要：
中国采用了全国性的碳排放交易市场来促进减排,但直到现在,配额的过度分配会降低碳价格，从而无法实现减排目标。我们报告了一个一般均衡模型，表明碳市场的灵活合规和价格调整机制，同时探讨了中国全国碳市场配额供过于求的解决方案。我们发现,在现行政策下,最初的宽松配额分配降低了整体碳价格，2030年银行碳配额总量达到48.80亿吨，导致碳价格水平无法实现NDC（国家自主贡献）目标。然而,通过引入碳市场价格调整计划，我们观察到津贴的累积数额可以有效地减少，使碳价上涨。重要的是,在基准减少情景下，津贴的供应量减少最多，这从一开始就增加了企业的减排压力，导致最大的经济损失，基于价格的调整机制将碳价格提高到预期水平，使经济损失最小化，与基于价格的调整机制相比，基于数量的调整机制对政策参数更敏感。这些发现为选择具有成本效益的价格调整机制以改善国家碳市场的价格机制设计提供了有希望的途径。
