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Abstract：
Under the dual-carbon background, coal power enterprises are required to actively fulfill their social responsibility in order to achieve energy saving and emission reduction as soon as possible. Considering the uncertainty of the external environment and the potential conflict of interest of the key stakeholders in the fulfillment of corporate social responsibility, coal power enterprises are not always positive in fulfilling their social responsibility. This paper combines prospect theory and mental account theory with evolutionary game to construct an evolutionary game model involving coal power enterprises, government regulators and the public to study the social responsibility behavior of coal power enterprises. The results of the study show that: (1) The social responsibility behavior of coal power enterprises under the dual-carbon background is a typical cost-driven behavior, and coal power enterprises are more sensitive to costs compared to benefits. (2) The formulation of regulatory policies by government regulators largely depends on the decision inertia of coal power enterprises, and the formulation of regulatory policies by government regulators will also affect the decision inertia of coal power enterprises. (3) The public\'s strategic choices do not entirely depend on the strategic choices of coal and power enterprises and government regulators, and are more closely related to the setting of the reference point. (4) In addition to the realistic factors, the subjective factors of decision makers are also important factors affecting the fulfillment of social responsibility of coal and power enterprises. Based on the results of the study, this paper proposes countermeasures to enhance the internal driving force of coal power enterprises to fulfill their social responsibility behaviors from the aspects of establishing a communication mechanism, improving the reward and punishment system, and strengthening risk management.
摘要：
在双重碳背景下,煤电企业要积极履行社会责任,尽快实现节能减排。考虑到外部环境的不确定性和关键利益相关者在履行企业社会责任过程中的潜在利益冲突,煤电企业并不总是积极履行社会责任。本文将前景理论和心理账户理论与演化博弈相结合,构建了一个涉及煤电企业的演化博弈模型,政府监管机构和公众对煤电企业社会责任行为进行研究。研究结果表明:(1)双碳背景下煤电企业的社会责任行为是典型的成本驱动行为,与效益相比，煤电企业对成本更为敏感。(2)政府监管机构制定监管政策很大程度上取决于煤电企业的决策惯性,而政府监管机构制定监管政策也会影响煤电企业的决策惯性。(3)公众的战略选择不完全取决于煤电企业和政府监管机构的战略选择,并且与参考点的设置更密切相关。(4)除现实因素外,决策者的主观因素也是影响煤电企业履行社会责任的重要因素。根据研究结果,本文从建立沟通机制,完善奖惩制度，加强风险管理。
