Abstract:
This paper provides experimental evidence on the economic determinants of intermediation networks by considering two pricing rules-respectively, criticality and betweenness-and three group sizes of subjects-10, 50, and 100 subjects. We find that when brokerage benefits accrue only to traders who lie on all paths of intermediation, stable networks involve interconnected cycles, and trading path lengths grow while linking and payoff inequality remain modest as the number of traders grows. By contrast, when brokerage benefits are equally distributed among traders on the shortest paths, stable networks contain a few hubs that provide the vast majority of links, and trading path lengths remain unchanged while linking and payoff inequality explode as the number of traders grows.
摘要:
本文通过考虑两种定价规则,分别为中介网络的经济决定因素提供了实验证据,临界性和介数-以及三组大小的受试者-10、50和100受试者。我们发现,当经纪利益只产生于躺在所有中介路径上的交易者时,稳定的网络涉及相互关联的循环,交易路径长度增长,而随着交易者数量的增长,联系和回报不平等仍然适度。相比之下,当经纪利益在最短路径上的交易者之间平均分配时,稳定的网络包含一些提供绝大多数链接的集线器,交易路径长度保持不变,而随着交易者数量的增加,联系和回报不平等会爆发。