Abstract：
This paper argues that Leibniz\'s use of the concept of \"automaton\" to characterize the nature of souls and bodies of living beings constitutes a systematic critique of Descartes\' earlier use of automata. Whereas Descartes conceived non-human animals in terms of mechanical automata, he also denied that the human rational soul can be modeled on the nature of an automaton. In contrast, Leibniz understood living things to involve both an organic body, or \"natural automaton,\" as well as an immaterial soul, or \"spiritual automaton,\" that spontaneously produces its own perceptions. In extending the concept of the automaton to souls, Leibniz rejected key Cartesian assumptions about animals and free will and draws on the concept of the automaton to understand a range of cognitive capacities including volition. Leibniz thus occupies a distinctive place in the history of the use of automata to understand the nature of living things.
摘要：
本文认为，莱布尼茨使用“自动机”的概念来表征生物的灵魂和身体的性质，构成了对笛卡尔早期使用自动机的系统批判。笛卡尔用机械自动机来设想非人类动物，他还否认人类理性的灵魂可以模仿自动机的本质。相比之下,莱布尼茨认为生物既涉及有机身体，或者“自然自动机”，“以及一个非物质的灵魂，或者“精神自动机”，“自发地产生自己的感知。在将自动机的概念扩展到灵魂时，莱布尼茨拒绝了关于动物和自由意志的关键笛卡尔假设，并借鉴了自动机的概念来理解包括意志在内的一系列认知能力。因此，莱布尼茨在使用自动机来理解生物本质的历史中占有独特的地位。
