Abstract：
Procreative obligations are often discussed by evaluating only the consequences of reproductive actions or omissions; less attention is paid to the moral role of intentions and attitudes. In this paper, I assess whether intentions and attitudes can contribute to defining our moral obligations with regard to assisted reproductive technologies already available, such as preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), and those that may be available in future, such as reproductive genome editing and ectogenesis, in a way compatible with person-affecting constraints. I propose the parent-child relationship argument, which is based on the moral distinction between creating and parenting a child. Hence, I first argue that intentions and attitudes can play a role in defining our moral obligations in reproductive decisions involving PGD. Second, I maintain that if we accept this and recognize reproductive genome editing and ectogenesis as person-affecting procedures, we should be committed to arguing that prospective parents may have moral reasons to prefer reproduction via such techniques than via sexual intercourse. In both cases, I observe an extension of our procreative responsibility beyond what is proposed by the consequentialist person-affecting morality.
摘要：
通常通过仅评估生殖行为或不作为的后果来讨论生殖义务；对意图和态度的道德作用的关注较少。在本文中,我评估意图和态度是否有助于确定我们对现有辅助生殖技术的道德义务，如植入前遗传学诊断（PGD），以及那些可能在未来可用的，如生殖基因组编辑和外生发生，在某种程度上符合影响人的约束。我提出了父子关系的论点，这是基于创造和养育孩子之间的道德区别。因此，我首先认为，意图和态度可以在定义涉及PGD的生殖决策中的道德义务方面发挥作用。第二,我坚持认为，如果我们接受这一点，并认识到生殖基因组编辑和外生发生是影响人的程序，我们应该致力于争辩说，准父母可能有道德理由更喜欢通过这种技术进行生殖，而不是通过性交。在这两种情况下，我观察到我们的生育责任的扩展超出了影响道德的结果主义者所提出的。
