PDF(Pubmed)
Abstract：
Dynamic norms have recently emerged as a powerful method to encourage individuals to adopt an innovation by highlighting a growing trend in its uptake. However, there have been no concrete attempts to understand how this individual-level mechanism might shape the collective population behavior. Here, we develop a framework to examine this by encapsulating dynamic norms within a game-theoretic mathematical model for innovation diffusion. Specifically, we extend a network coordination game by incorporating a probabilistic mechanism where an individual adopts the action with growing popularity, instead of the standard best-response update rule; the probability of such an event captures the population\'s \"sensitivity\" to dynamic norms. Theoretical analysis reveals that sensitivity to dynamic norms is key to facilitating social diffusion. Small increases in sensitivity reduces the advantage of the innovation over status quo or the number of initial innovators required to unlock diffusion, while a sufficiently large sensitivity alone guarantees diffusion.
摘要：
动态规范最近已成为一种强大的方法，可以通过强调创新的发展趋势来鼓励个人采用创新。然而,没有具体的尝试来理解这种个体层面的机制如何塑造集体人口行为。这里,我们开发了一个框架，通过将动态规范封装在创新扩散的博弈论数学模型中来检验这一点。具体来说,我们通过合并概率机制来扩展网络协调游戏，其中个人采用越来越受欢迎的动作，而不是标准的最佳响应更新规则；这种事件的概率捕获了人口对动态规范的“敏感性”。理论分析表明，对动态规范的敏感性是促进社会扩散的关键。灵敏度的小幅增加降低了创新相对于现状的优势或解锁扩散所需的初始创新者的数量，而足够大的灵敏度单独保证扩散。
