Abstract：
The fact that people often have preference rankings for their partners is a distinctive aspect of human behavior. Little is known, however, about how this talent as a powerful force shapes human behavioral traits, including those which should not have been favored by selection, such as cooperation in social dilemma situations. Here we propose a dynamic model in which network-structured individuals can switch their interaction partners within neighborhoods based on their preferences. For the partner switching, we propose two interruption regimes: dictatorial regime and negotiating regime. In the dictatorial regime, focal individuals are able to suspend interactions out of preferences unilaterally. In the negotiating regime, either focal individuals or the associated partners agree to suspend, then these interactions can be successfully suspended. We investigate the evolution of cooperation under both preference-driven partner switching regimes in the context of both the weakened variant of the donation game and the standard one. Specifically, we theoretically approximate the critical conditions for cooperation to be favored by weak selection in the weakened donation game where cooperators bear a unit cost to provide a benefit for each active neighbor and simulate the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the standard donation game to test the robustness of the analytical results. Under dictatorial regime, selection of cooperation becomes harder when individuals have preferences for either cooperator or defector partners, implying that the expulsion of defectors by cooperators is overwhelmed by the chasing of defectors towards cooperators. Under negotiating regime, both preferences for cooperator and defector partners can significantly favor the evolution of cooperation, yet underlying mechanisms differ greatly. For preferences over cooperator partners, cooperator-cooperator interaction relationships are reinforced and the associated mutual reciprocity can resist and assimilate defectors. For preferences over defector partners, defector-defector interaction relationships are anchored, weakening defectors\' exploitation over cooperators. Cooperators are thus offered much time space to interact among cospecies and spread. Our work may help better understand the critical role of preference-based adaptive partner switching in promoting the evolution of cooperation.
摘要：
人们经常对伴侣有偏好排名这一事实是人类行为的一个独特方面。鲜为人知，然而,关于这种天赋作为一种强大的力量如何塑造人类的行为特征，包括那些不应该受到选择的人，例如在社会困境中的合作。在这里，我们提出了一个动态模型，在该模型中，网络结构的个体可以根据自己的偏好在社区内切换他们的交互伙伴。对于合作伙伴交换，我们提出了两种中断制度:独裁制度和谈判制度。在独裁政权中,焦点个体能够单方面出于偏好而暂停互动。在谈判制度中，焦点个人或相关合作伙伴同意暂停，然后这些交互可以成功暂停。我们在捐赠游戏的弱化变体和标准游戏的背景下，研究了两种偏好驱动的合作伙伴转换机制下的合作演变。具体来说,我们从理论上逼近了弱捐赠博弈中弱选择对合作有利的临界条件，其中合作者承担单位成本为每个主动邻居提供收益，并模拟了标准捐赠博弈中合作的进化动力学，以检验分析结果的稳健性。在独裁政权下,当个人对合作者或叛逃者的合作伙伴有偏好时，选择合作变得更加困难，这意味着合作者驱逐叛逃者被叛逃者追逐合作者所淹没。在谈判制度下，对合作者和叛逃者伙伴的偏好都可以显著有利于合作的发展，然而，潜在的机制差异很大。对于高于合作伙伴合作伙伴的偏好，合作者与合作者的相互作用关系得到加强，相关的互惠可以抵抗和同化叛逃者。对于叛逃者合作伙伴的偏好，偏转器-偏转器的相互作用关系被锚定，削弱叛逃者对合作者的剥削。因此，为合作者提供了很多时间空间来在物种之间进行交互和传播。我们的工作可能有助于更好地理解基于偏好的适应性伙伴转换在促进合作发展中的关键作用。
