关键词: conformance electronic gaming institutional theory manipulation partial legitimacy sports governance sports organization

来  源:   DOI:10.3389/fspor.2022.869151   PDF(Pubmed)

Abstract:
The dominant position of esports game publishers is a fundamental difference between the systemic governance of esports and traditional sports. There are no such equivalent organizations in traditional sports. As for-profit corporations, the publishers develop and market the electronic games as their commercial products and thus, possess exclusive property rights. Publishers control the virtual sporting environment and the rules of the game. In conventional sports, by contrast, non-profit associations administer their sports with the core task of developing the sport by regulations, playing rules, and licensing. There are, however, esports associations which resemble traditional leagues and national governing bodies. Given this, we explore how esports associations pursue legitimacy. This study is empirically motivated by the recent emergence of two esports associations in the insightful case of Germany and examines the pursuit of legitimacy by the World Esports Association (WESA) and the eSport-Bund Deutschland e.V. (ESBD). The study is based on a content analysis of 55 documents and nine interviews with relevant stakeholders. The findings show that the esports associations rely on conformance and manipulation strategies by transferring existing structures from traditional sports to esports. The most effective practices are lobbying for social and public acceptance of esports and creating supportive networks for esports development. While publishers possess an undisputed and taken-for-granted legitimacy based on their product property rights, esports associations struggle for recognition and acceptance. They may still have a long way to go, given that established associations in conventional sports have a history for decades. Yet, esports associations need to accept publisher dominance. Thus, they can only claim partial legitimacy within the esports ecosystem by targeting segments of stakeholders. Management, policy and theoretical implications of this key insight are finally presented.
摘要:
电子竞技游戏发行商的主体地位是电子竞技系统治理与传统体育的根本区别。在传统体育中没有这样的同等组织。作为营利性公司,出版商开发和销售电子游戏作为其商业产品,因此,拥有专有财产权。发行商控制虚拟运动环境和游戏规则。在传统运动中,相比之下,非营利协会以规范发展体育为核心任务,游戏规则,和许可。有,然而,类似于传统联盟和国家管理机构的电竞协会。鉴于此,我们探索电竞协会如何追求合法性。这项研究是由最近在德国有见地的案例中出现的两个电子竞技协会的经验驱动的,并研究了世界电子竞技协会(WESA)和电子竞技外滩Deutschlande.V.(ESBD)对合法性的追求。该研究基于对55份文件的内容分析和对相关利益相关者的9次访谈。研究结果表明,电竞协会通过将现有结构从传统体育转移到电竞来依靠一致性和操纵策略。最有效的做法是游说社会和公众接受电子竞技,并为电子竞技发展建立支持性网络。虽然出版商基于其产品产权拥有无可争议的和理所当然的合法性,电子竞技协会为获得承认和接受而斗争。他们可能还有很长的路要走,鉴于传统体育的既定协会已有数十年的历史。然而,电子竞技协会需要接受出版商的主导地位。因此,他们只能通过针对利益相关者的部分来主张在电子竞技生态系统中的部分合法性。管理,最后提出了这一关键见解的政策和理论意义。
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