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Abstract：
Developmental and neuroscience works have demonstrated that the moral judgment is influenced by theory of mind (ToM), which refers to the ability to represent the mental states of different agents. However, the neural and cognitive time course of interactions between moral judgment and ToM remains unclear. The present event-related potential (ERP) study investigated the underlying neural substrate of the interaction between moral judgment and ToM by contrasting the ERPs elicited by moral judgments for self and for others in moral dilemmas. In classic moral dilemmas, the agents must choose between the utilitarian choice (taking the action to kill or harm an innocent person but saving more people) and the non-utilitarian choice (taking no action to kill or harm the innocent person but letting some people die). The ERPs were recorded from participants who made moral judgments for self and for others when the agent made utilitarian or non-utilitarian choices during the dilemma. The results revealed that the moral judgment for others elicited a larger frontal late positive component (LPC, 500-900 ms) than that for self when the agents made utilitarian choices, while no difference was observed on early components of N1, P2, and N2. Moreover, individual differences in mentalizing ability were negatively correlated with the LPC amplitudes. These findings suggested that ToM modulated the late controlled process but not the early automatic process during moral judgments.
摘要：
发展和神经科学的工作已经证明，道德判断受到心理理论（ToM）的影响。这是指代表不同代理人精神状态的能力。然而,道德判断与ToM之间相互作用的神经和认知时间过程尚不清楚。当前的事件相关电位（ERP）研究通过对比道德困境中的自我和他人的道德判断所引起的ERP，研究了道德判断与ToM之间相互作用的潜在神经基础。在经典的道德困境中，代理人必须在功利选择(采取行动杀死或伤害无辜的人，但拯救更多的人)和非功利选择(不采取行动杀死或伤害无辜的人，但让一些人死亡)之间做出选择。当代理人在困境中做出功利主义或非功利主义选择时，对自我和他人做出道德判断的参与者记录了ERP。结果表明，对他人的道德判断会引起更大的额叶晚期正成分(LPC，500-900毫秒)比代理人做出功利主义选择时的自我而在N1，P2和N2的早期成分上没有观察到差异。此外，心理能力的个体差异与LPC振幅呈负相关。这些发现表明，在道德判断过程中，ToM调节了后期控制过程，而不是早期自动过程。
