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Abstract：
Evolutionary conflict and arms races are important drivers of evolution in nature. During arms races, new abilities in one party select for counterabilities in the second party. This process can repeat and lead to successive fixations of novel mutations, without a long-term increase in fitness. Models of co-evolution rarely address successive fixations, and one of the main models that use successive fixations-Fisher\'s geometric model-does not address co-evolution. We address this gap by expanding Fisher\'s geometric model to the evolution of joint phenotypes that are affected by two parties, such as probability of infection of a host by a pathogen. The model confirms important intuitions and offers some new insights. Conflict can lead to long-term Sisyphean arms races, where parties continue to climb toward their fitness peaks, but are dragged back down by their opponents. This results in far more adaptive evolution compared to the standard geometric model. It also results in fixation of mutations of larger effect, with the important implication that the common modeling assumption of small mutations will apply less often under conflict. Even in comparison with random abiotic change of the same magnitude, evolution under conflict results in greater distances from the optimum, lower fitness, and more fixations, but surprisingly, not larger fixed mutations. We also show how asymmetries in selection strength, mutation size, and mutation input allow one party to win over another. However, winning abilities come with diminishing returns, helping to keep weaker parties in the game.
摘要：
进化冲突和军备竞赛是自然界进化的重要驱动力。在军备竞赛期间,一方的新能力选择另一方的对抗能力。这个过程可以重复并导致新突变的连续固定，没有长期增加健身。共同进化的模型很少解决连续的固定问题，使用连续固定的主要模型之一-费舍尔的几何模型-不涉及共同进化。我们通过将Fisher的几何模型扩展到受两方影响的联合表型的进化来解决这一差距，例如病原体感染宿主的概率。该模型证实了重要的直觉，并提供了一些新的见解。冲突会导致长期的Sisyphean军备竞赛，派对继续爬向他们的健身高峰，但被对手拖回。与标准几何模型相比，这导致了更多的自适应进化。它还会导致对更大效果的突变的固定，重要的含义是，小突变的常见建模假设在冲突下应用的频率较低。即使与相同幅度的随机非生物变化相比，冲突下的进化导致与最优的距离更大，较低的健身，和更多的关注，但令人惊讶的是，不是更大的固定突变。我们还展示了选择强度的不对称性，突变大小,和突变输入允许一方赢得另一方。然而,获胜能力伴随着收益递减，帮助弱者保持在游戏中。
